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THE FEDERAL EQUITY POWER 
MICHAEL T. MORLEY* 
Abstract: Throughout the first century and a half of our nation’s history, federal 
courts treated equity as a type of general law. They applied a uniform, freestand-
ing body of principles derived from the English Court of Chancery to all equita-
ble issues that came before them, regardless of whether a case arose under fed-
eral or state law. In 1945, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, the United States Su-
preme Court held that, notwithstanding the changes wrought by the Erie Doc-
trine, federal courts may continue to rely on these traditional principles of equity 
to determine the availability of equitable relief, such as injunctions, even in cas-
es arising under state law. This so-called “equitable remedial rights doctrine” is 
based on an anachronistic misunderstanding of the nature of the federal equity 
power. Equity should not be understood as a single, independent body of princi-
ples that a federal court must apply in all cases that come before it. Rather, a 
federal court’s power to impose an equitable remedy stems, if at all, from the le-
gal authority that establishes the underlying right. For state-law claims, a federal 
court must apply state statutes and precedents—not uniform, centrally devised 
federal standards—to determine the availability of equitable relief. The manner 
in which state-created rights are protected is as much a matter of substantive 
state policy as a state’s initial creation and allocation of those rights. When ad-
judicating a federal statutory claim, the underlying federal statute itself governs 
the availability of equitable relief; a federal court may presume Congress in-
tended that traditional equitable principles apply as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation, unless the statute’s text or legislative history contains a clear statement 
to the contrary.  Finally, for constitutional claims, federal courts may apply tra-
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ditional equitable principles as a matter of constitutional common law, unless 
Congress displaces them with a valid alternative remedial scheme. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under what circumstances should a federal court grant equitable relief, 
such as an injunction, in a diversity case?1 The answer to this deceptively 
simple question implicates profound issues going to the root of both federal-
ism and separation of powers, and has wide-ranging ramifications for our 
modern conception of the federal judiciary’s equity power. In 2006, in eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the United States Supreme Court articulated its 
well-known four-factor test for granting injunctive relief, which it claimed 
was derived from principles historically applied by the English Court of 
Chancery.2 Many states, in contrast, have their own, differing standards for 
injunctive relief; rather than applying a balancing test, several states either 
require or prohibit the award of injunctive relief in certain types of cases.3 A 
court’s decision as to whether to apply federal or state standards for granting 
an injunction may, in many cases, determine a litigant’s ability to obtain inter-
im or final relief. 
Part of the difficulty underlying this choice-of-law issue stems from Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Thompkins.4 Erie, as construed in cases such as the 1965 Su-
preme Court decision Hanna v. Plumer, directs federal courts to apply state 
law for “substantive” issues and federal law for “procedural” issues in cases 
arising under state law.5 Some scholars contend, however, that remedies are 
neither purely procedural nor substantive but rather share attributes of both (a 
position I reject).6 Consequently, many remedial issues fit awkwardly at best 
within the Erie framework.7 
                                                                                                                                       
 1 This article’s analysis applies to any claim in federal court arising under state law. Although 
diversity cases are the primary focus, its conclusions apply equally to claims within a federal 
court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988). 
 2 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006); see infra notes 265–266 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra notes 415–431 and accompanying text. 
 4 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 5 Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 6 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 
2 (2d ed. 1993); David Crump, The Twilight Zone of the Erie Doctrine: Is There Really a Different 
Choice of Equitable Remedies in the “Court a Block Away”?, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1233, 1235 
(arguing that equitable remedies “look both substantive and procedural”); cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (4th ed. 2010) (“The law of remedies falls somewhere in be-
tween procedure and primary substantive rights. Remedies are substantive, but they are distinct 
from the rest of the substantive law, and sometimes their details blur into procedure.”). 
 7 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 401–02 
(2010) (holding that a federal court sitting in diversity may not apply a state law prohibiting class 
actions for statutory penalties on the grounds the issue is procedural). 
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More fundamentally, the federal judiciary’s conception of its equity 
power is anachronistic, rooted in a pre-Erie framework. Federal courts often  
treat equity as an independent body of law that is binding upon them of its 
own force,8 akin to the general law that Erie repudiated.9 In 1945, in Guaran-
ty Trust Co. v. York,10 one of the United States Supreme Court’s major post-
Erie cases, the Court partly endorsed this understanding. Guaranty Trust re-
quires federal courts to apply a uniform body of equitable principles tracing 
back to the English Court of Chancery—as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court—when deciding whether to grant equitable relief, regardless of wheth-
er the underlying claim arises under federal or state law.11 Several commenta-
tors termed this principle the “equitable remedial rights doctrine.”12   
This prevailing understanding of equity law is irredeemably flawed. 
This Article proposes a new understanding of the federal judiciary’s equity 
power. Equity should not be understood as a single, freestanding body of 
principles that federal courts must apply regardless of whether a case arises 
under federal or state law. Neither the U.S. Constitution, federal law, nor the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes federal courts to craft and apply a 
uniform body of equitable principles, including equitable remedial principles, 
to all claims that come before them, regardless of the source of law from 
which a claim arises. The assertion of such authority exceeds federalism-
based limits on the federal government’s power as a whole, the scope of fed-
eral courts’ Article III judicial power, the judiciary’s authority under the Rules 
of Decision Act,13 and the policy considerations underlying Erie itself. 
The source of a federal court’s power to impose an equitable remedy 
comes, if at all, from the legal authority that establishes the underlying right, 
whether it is state common law, a state statute or constitution, a federal stat-
ute, or the U.S. Constitution. Just as each state is free to craft its own body of 
common law that federal courts are bound to enforce, it should likewise have 
the power to develop its own equitable rules and principles that are equally 
binding in both state and federal court, even for remedial issues.  Federal 
courts should apply state statutes and precedents, rather than federal equitable 
principles, in deciding whether to grant equitable relief for claims arising un-
der state law.   
                                                                                                                                       
 8 See, e.g., infra note 23; see also infra notes 218–225 and accompanying text. 
 9 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 10 326 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1945). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Comment, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, 55 YALE L.J. 401, 416–17 (1945); 
Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine: Past and Present, 67 HARV. L. REV. 836, 836, 
843–44 (1954) [hereinafter Past and Present]. 
 13 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
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Federal equity law should be reconceptualized as the body of principles 
that courts presumptively apply in the absence of contrary federal statutory 
requirements when deciding whether to grant equitable relief under the U.S. 
Constitution or a federal statute. Congress may decide how statutory rights it 
creates should be enforced.14 When a federal law provides for an equitable 
remedy such as an injunction, a court may presume Congress intended to im-
plicitly incorporate and rely upon traditional equitable principles as a matter 
of statutory interpretation, in the absence of express language to the contrary 
in the law’s text or legislative history.15 When enforcing constitutional re-
strictions, federal courts are free to apply those traditional equitable principles 
as a matter of constitutional common law, unless Congress displaces them 
with an alternate remedial scheme.16 In short, in a post-Erie world, equity 
stems from and follows the law. Guaranty Trust should be interred as a lin-
gering remnant of a pre-Erie legal positivist era. 
Prior to Erie, numerous commentators explored the effects of state stat-
utes and court rulings on federal equitable principles.17 In the decades since, 
                                                                                                                                       
 14 Standing and related doctrines limit Congress’ power to authorize the enforcement of fed-
eral laws through private rights of action. See Michael T. Morley, Spokeo: The Quasi-Hohfeldian 
Plaintiff and the Non-Federal Federal Question, GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (man-
uscript at 8–9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2946482 [https://perma.cc/
A89R-TGWD]. 
 15 See infra notes 432–436 and accompanying text. Of course, extensive debates exist over 
whether courts may rely on legislative history when construing or applying federal statutes. See 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 956 (3d ed. 2001) (collecting sources). This 
Article’s conclusions apply with equal force even if limited solely to the text of the statute itself. 
 16 See infra notes 437–439 and accompanying text. 
 17 See, e.g., N.C. Collier, Limitations on Federal Courts in Administering State Law, 75 
CENT. L.J. 330, 336 (1912) (arguing that a federal court in equity should act as “purely a substitute 
jurisdiction” for state courts, to protect defendants’ rights); Robert von Moschzisker, Equity Juris-
diction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 301 (1927) (contending that the “truly na-
tional” system of equity had the “strength and flexibility” necessary to “meet the demands of 
changing conditions which require equitable treatment”); Note, Effect of State Laws on the Equity 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 3 VA. L. REV. 227, 230–32 (1915) [hereinafter Effect of State 
Laws] (explaining that state statutes may not expand a federal court’s equity jurisdiction, yet 
sometimes effectively do so by creating new substantive rights that a federal court sitting in equity 
must enforce); Note, The Effect of State Statutes on Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 33 
YALE L.J. 193 (1923) [hereinafter The Effect of State Statutes] (arguing that federal courts should 
enforce state statutes creating new forms of equitable relief only when the common law did not 
provide relief under similar circumstances); Note, Equity Jurisdiction of a Federal Court to Set 
Aside a Will by Force of a State Statute, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 47 (1903) [hereinafter Equity Jurisdic-
tion] (discussing various circumstances in which a federal court would not enforce state statutes in 
equity cases); Note, State Laws in Federal Courts of Equity, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 590 (1904) 
(arguing that federal courts sitting in equity should apply uniform federal equitable standards in 
diversity cases, except “in matters which are essentially local,” such as property disputes or cases 
involving marital rights); Note, State Statutes and the Federal Equity Courts, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 
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some brief pieces considered the continuing validity of the equitable remedial 
rights doctrine.18 Despite the voluminous body of literature on Erie, however, 
the issue remains unresolved19 and books on remedies generally overlook it. 
Commentators continue to reach conflicting conclusions concerning the ap-
plicability of state equitable principles in federal court, and very few have 
offered a comprehensive analysis of modern federal equity.20 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                                       
688 (1932) (discussing various doctrines that limit the obligation of federal courts sitting in equity 
to enforce state statutes). 
 18 The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, supra note 12, at 416–17 (arguing that federal 
courts should treat remedial issues as “substantive[,]” requiring them to apply state law); Past and 
Present, supra note 12, at 843–44 (arguing that a “federal court in diversity matters should ordi-
narily grant the same remedy that would be given in a state court” but apply federal standards to 
“matters of judicial housekeeping” such as “supervision of receivers” and “enforcement of injunc-
tions”). 
 19 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 577 n.1 (6th ed. 2009) (“Scholars have disagreed on the appropriateness of 
recognizing a special role for federal equity in fashioning remedies in cases falling within the 
scope of the Erie doctrine.”); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1207, 1248 n.172 (2001) (“There remains some disagreement over the scope of a federal 
court’s authority when sitting in diversity to exercise federal equity powers in lieu of following 
state rules.”); Past and Present, supra note 12, at 839 (“[I]t is not clear whether the overruling of 
Swift by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins destroys the remedial rights doctrine, especially since many of the 
cases espousing that doctrine disregarded state statutes as well as decisions.”). 
 20 Professor David Crump raised the equitable remedial rights issue as a vehicle for advocat-
ing that Erie questions be resolved based on a modified version of the interest-balancing test of 
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). Crump, supra note 6, 
at 1235, 1272–73 (concluding that federal courts should apply state law standards in determining 
whether to grant equitable relief for claims arising under state law, except when “strong federal 
interests overcome weaker state ones”); see also Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunction Stand-
ards in Massachusetts State and Federal Courts, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 47–48, 53 (2013) 
(arguing that, under Hanna v. Plumer, federal courts should apply state law to determine whether 
to issue a preliminary injunction); Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 513, 519 (1958) (arguing that federal courts should apply state law equitable and 
remedial principles in state-law cases where the choice of such principles would “actually influ-
ence the parties’ prelitigation conduct” and uniform federal principles concerning equitable reme-
dies in all other cases). 
 Professor John T. Cross urged the opposite perspective, arguing that the Constitution gives 
federal judges the power to apply “a separate body of federal equity law,” based on the principles 
that the English Court of Chancery employed in the eighteenth century, in both state and federal 
cases. John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 175, 214, 226 (1999). 
More recently, Professor David E. Shipley urged the same conclusion specifically with regard to 
the standards governing preliminary injunctions. David E. Shipley, The Preliminary Injunction 
Standard in Diversity: A Typical Unguided Erie Choice, 50 GA. L. REV. 1169 (2016). He contends 
that such standards are procedural because they are not likely to affect a plaintiff’s choice of fo-
rum, and neither dictate the ultimate outcome of a case nor create the type of inequality among 
litigants that Erie condemns. Id. at 1217–18, 1221. Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice and 
Procedure treatise adopts something of a compromise position, declaring that federal standards 
should govern interim relief such as preliminary injunctions, while state law standards generally 
should govern permanent relief, except in “exceptional cases” where applying federal standards 
would allow federal courts to “effect justice expeditiously or creatively.” 19 CHARLES ALAN 
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Court has recognized the choice-of-law problem concerning the proper stand-
ard for equitable relief in state-law cases, but declined to address it on the 
merits.21 Lower federal courts have adopted a variety of approaches, many 
either avoiding the issue22 or choosing to apply federal equitable standards 
pursuant to Guaranty Trust.23 This Article presents a comprehensive analysis 
of Erie’s application to equity, offering a new understanding of the federal 
equity power, particularly with regard to remedial issues.  
Part I of this Article begins by tracing the development of equity law in 
England.24 Part II explores equity’s adoption in the United States, explaining 
that federal courts treated it analogously to general law under the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                       
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4513, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 
2017). 
 An influential pair of articles discussed the scope of federal courts’ equitable powers specifi-
cally in the bankruptcy context. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1013, 1050 (1953) (arguing that a federal court may apply its own equitable judgment, rather than 
following state law, for issues within the scope of Congress’ bankruptcy power); Thomas E. 
Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 669–70 (2004) (arguing 
that a federal court may use its own equity powers instead of applying state law when the federal 
bankruptcy statute authorizes it to do so). 
 A few commentators have touched on or acknowledged the issue without adopting a norma-
tive position in the course of developing largely unrelated arguments. See Fitzgerald, supra note 
19, at 1270–73; Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 673, 684–85 (2001); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and 
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 511 (1954); Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of 
Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1214 n.252 (1996); Kevin C. 
Mulder, Note, The Extension of Comity: Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 
32 AM. U. L. REV. 1123, 1152 n.167 (1986). For a thorough historical discussion of the federal 
judiciary’s equitable powers, see generally Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Opera-
tion”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249 (2010). 
 21 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 
n.3 (1999) (declining to address the argument that the availability of injunctive relief in a diversity 
case “should be determined by the law of the forum State” rather than Rule 65 and “federal equity 
principles,” because the issue “was neither raised nor considered below”); see also Stern v. S. 
Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 609–10 (1968) (declining to decide in a diversity case “where 
such a federal [injunctive] remedy can be provided even in the absence of a similar state reme-
dy . . . because it is clear that state law here also provides for enforcement of the shareholder’s 
right by a compulsory judicial order”). 
 22 See, e.g., Charlesbank Equity Fund II, Ltd. P’ship v. Blinds to Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 158 
(1st Cir. 2004); Paradigm Biodevices, Inc. v. Centinel Spine, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 3489 (JMF), 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66858, at *4 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013); Carlson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
NA, No. 10–272 (PJS/AJB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33072, at *8–9 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2010). 
 23 See, e.g., Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800, 806 (2d Cir. 1981); 
Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 1970); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Watt W. Inv. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 287, 290 (E.D. Cal. 1991). Other courts have held that the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly require federal courts to apply traditional equitable stand-
ards when deciding whether to grant an injunction or receivership in diversity cases. See, e.g., 
infra notes 270, 283 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 30–80 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson.25 Part III goes on to show that the 
Supreme Court partly preserved this conception of federal equity law, despite 
Erie, in Guaranty Trust.26 Part IV demonstrates that neither the U.S. Constitu-
tion, federal law, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a basis for 
recognizing a uniform or freestanding body of equitable principles that feder-
al courts are bound to apply to all cases that come before them, including for 
remedial issues.27  
This Part also offers a new conception of equity: the equitable principles 
a court must apply to a claim arise from the source of law giving rise to that 
cause of action. Equitable relief for state-law claims should be determined by 
state law, including state statutes and precedents. For federal statutory claims, 
a court may presume, in the absence of contrary evidence, that Congress im-
plicitly incorporated into the statute traditional equitable principles of the 
English Court of Chancery as construed by the Supreme Court.28 Likewise, 
for claims under the U.S. Constitution, courts may apply those traditional eq-
uitable principles as a matter of constitutional common law, unless Congress 
has created an alternate remedial scheme. In cases involving a mix of state 
and federal claims, a litigant may be entitled to equitable relief under one set 
of standards, but not the other. The Conclusion summarizes this Article’s rec-
ommendations.29 
Commentators have adopted numerous, conflicting interpretations of the 
Erie Doctrine. The arguments here are intended to be “Erie agnostic”: equally 
applicable regardless of whether one believes the Erie Doctrine is rooted in 
federalism-based limits on the federal government’s power, separation-of-
powers limits on the federal judiciary’s power, statutory interpretation of the 
Rules of Decision Act, or merely sound policy considerations. 
I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal courts are generally 
required to apply the same principles of equity as the English Court of Chan-
cery did in 1789.30 Before assessing the legal and constitutional rationale for 
                                                                                                                                       
 25 See infra notes 81–181 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 182–227 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 228–441 and accompanying text. 
 28 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); Winter v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  
 29 See infra Conclusion. 
 30 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319 (considering whether “the relief respondents requested 
here was traditionally accorded by courts of equity”); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 
563, 568 (1939) (holding that federal courts have “authority to administer in equity suits the prin-
ciples of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by 
the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries”). 
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this principle, it is helpful to lay a foundation by examining the nature and 
development of equity in England. 
Equity evolved in England as a natural outgrowth of the King’s inherent 
power and duty to do justice.31 In the years following the Norman Conquest, 
most legal business was conducted in county or manorial courts; no royal 
courts existed at the time.32 When a person could not obtain adequate relief 
from a local court—for example, due to the social position or connections of 
his adversaries33—he could directly petition the King for aid. As the “foun-
tain[] of justice,”34 the King could grant relief when ordinary legal institutions 
were insufficient, unwilling, or unable to do so.35 The King could issue a writ 
directing the lord of the manor or some public official to do “full right” to the 
plaintiff, or else directly order a respondent to take (or refrain from taking) 
some action.36 
By the late twelfth century, to alleviate the need for people to seek relief 
directly from the Crown, the royal courts of King’s Bench, Exchequer, and 
Common Pleas began to develop outside the main legal system of county and 
manorial courts,37 each with jurisdiction over different types of cases. There 
were very few statutes and precedents; these courts resolved disputes based 
on both law and equitable principles without distinguishing between them,38 
and granted relief such as the Writ of Prohibition and the Writ of Estrepment 
that resembled injunctions in many ways.39 
To initiate a lawsuit in a royal court, a plaintiff had to obtain a royal writ 
from the Chancellor. The Chancellor was a member of the King’s royal coun-
cil, or curia, who kept the royal seal and issued documents in the name of the 
                                                                                                                                       
 31 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 681 (5th ed. 
1956). 
 32 GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3–4 (5th ed. 1893); JOHN H. LANG-
BEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 18–19 (2009). 
 33 BISPHAM, supra note 32, at 11. 
 34 D. KERLY, A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF 
CHANCERY 13 (1890). 
 35 See LANGBEIN, supra note 32, at 90–91; see also Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 17 
(1275) (declaring that “the King, which is Sovereign Lord over all, shall do Right there unto such 
as will complain”). 
 36 MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 151–52 (1880). 
 37 LANGBEIN, supra note 32, at 118–22; PLUCKNETT, supra note 31, at 147–51; Harold D. 
Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY 261, 262 (P. 
Vinogradoff ed. 1913). 
 38 George B. Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 89 (1916); see 
also Hazeltine, supra note 37, at 262. 
 39 David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J. 539, 545–
50 (1986). 
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Crown.40 In the earliest years of the royal courts, the Chancellor had authority 
to craft writs based on the specific circumstances of each case, allowing 
plaintiffs to pursue claims as justice demanded.41 Over the course of the thir-
teenth century, other governmental institutions greatly circumscribed the 
Chancellor’s power to craft new types of writs. The royal courts often refused 
to accept new writs, asserting for themselves the prerogative to determine 
whether to recognize new rights.42 Likewise, Parliament claimed for itself the 
power to create new writs.43 
The Court of Common Pleas’ refusal to recognize new writs caused the 
common law to ossify. As Common Pleas increased in size and grew more 
distant from the Crown over the mid-fourteenth century, it became reluctant 
to exercise the King’s royal prerogative to adjudicate cases based on equitable 
considerations.44 Moreover, the common-law lawyers who had largely sup-
planted clerics as judges on the court were more inclined to base their rulings 
on the common law rather than canon law or equitable principles.45  
The reluctance of Common Pleas to embrace new grounds for relief 
compelled many people to seek relief directly from the King and his royal 
council. As the number of such petitions increased, the council delegated re-
sponsibility for considering them to the Chancellor.46 By 1400, complainants 
presented their petitions directly to the Chancellor.47 A Court of Chancery 
gradually developed around the Chancellor to facilitate his role. 
During the early years of the Chancery Court, most Chancellors were 
bishops because they were among the only literate people in the govern-
ment.48 Chancellors thus tended to be familiar with, and rely upon, ecclesias-
tic and Roman law, as well as the writings of Catholic scholars such as 
Thomas Aquinas, rather than the common law.49 It was through Aquinas’ 
works that Aristotle’s conception of equity made its way into English law.50 
                                                                                                                                       
 40 Timothy S. Haskett, The Medieval English Court of Chancery, 14 L. & HIST. REV. 245, 
247 (1996). 
 41 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 398 (A.L. Goodhart & 
H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956). 
         42 PLUCKNETT, supra note 31, at 164. 
 43 See Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 
834–35 (1918). 
 44 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 447–48, 454. 
 45 2 id. at 345. 
 46 1 id. at 339–402, 404; PLUCKNETT, supra note 31, at 180–81; see also PETER CHARLES 
HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 26 (1990). 
 47 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 117 (3d ed. 1990). 
 48 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47; Haskett, supra note 40, at 247. 
 49 See CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, THE REPLICATION OF A SERJEANT AT THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND (1787), reprinted in J.A. GUY, CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN ON CHANCERY AND STATUTE 
101 (J.A. Guy ed., Selden Soc’y 1985) (alleging that English Chancellors “had but superficiall 
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Aquinas’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics explains, “[B]y equi-
ty a person is obedient in a higher way when he follows the intention of the 
legislator where the words of the law differ from it.”51 Aquinas emphasized 
that human reason is limited, and legislators therefore cannot perfectly recog-
nize and capture all the details and nuances of natural law.52 Judges must in-
voke equity to correct inevitable defects in the law, thereby better enforcing 
natural justice. In Aquinas’ view, the “nature of the equitable is that it be di-
rective of the law where the law is deficient for some particular case . . . . Be-
cause the material of human acts is indeterminate . . . the law[] must be inde-
terminate in the sense that it is not absolutely rigid.”53 Aquinas’ Summa Theo-
logica offered an affirmative response to the question of “Whether He who is 
Under a Law May Act Beside the Letter of the Law.”54 It explains that “if a 
case arise[s] wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the gen-
eral welfare, it should not be observed.”55 
Applying this conception of equity, Chancellors exercised extremely 
broad discretion, doing justice in individual cases based on their personal no-
tions of fairness, informed by natural law principles, despite the common 
law’s limits.56 “[E]quity courts interpreted documents loosely, often to the 
extent of rewriting them, in order to achieve a result that the Chancellor be-
lieved to be just . . . . Likewise, statutes which produced unjust results were 
interpreted in contorted and fanciful ways to avoid unjust outcomes.”57 
                                                                                                                                       
knowledge of the lawes of the realme”); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 36 (Dorset Press 
1986) (1861). 
 50 Aristotle wrote that a statute may be unjust as applied to certain situations not contemplated 
by its drafters. He explained that epieikeia—which is typically translated as “equity” or “fair–
mindedness,” Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of “Equity” (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 119, 125–26 (1942); Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 99–
100 (2006)—is the “correction of law, where law falls short because of its universality.” ARISTO-
TLE, RHETORIC 1374a (David J. Furley & Alexander Nehamas eds. 1994). When a statute is 
broadly written, a court must apply it by “say[ing] what the legislator himself would have said had 
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ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 141–42 (Martin Ostwald, trans. Bobbs–Merrill, 1962). 
“[W]hen the law speaks universally,” he elaborated, “and a case arises on it which is not covered 
by the universal statement, then it is right, when the legislator fails us and has erred by over-
simplicity, to correct the omission.” Id. 
 51 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 466 (C.I. Litzinger 
trans., 1964). 
 52 Id. at 467–68. 
 53 Id. at 466. 
 54 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1021 (Richard C. Meyer trans., 1947). 
 55 Id. 
 56 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 467; F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND 225–26 (H. Fisher ed. 1920). 
 57 John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of American Judging, 
34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (1998). 
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Commentators often claimed that the Chancellor applied natural law or fol-
lowed the dictates of his “conscience.”58 The unavoidably subjective aspects 
of equity led to the criticism that equity varied with the length of the Chancel-
lor’s foot.59 
The Court of Chancery was not bound by strict notions of precedent;60 
indeed, throughout Chancery’s early history, written rulings were not even 
published or widely available. The court recognized and enforced a broad 
range of equitable rights that could not be asserted in common-law courts, 
such as rights relating to trusts and uses.61 It was primarily responsible for 
many other areas of law, as well, including agency law, partnerships, and 
suretyships, and recognized defenses unavailable at law, such as fraud.62   
Equity enabled the continued development of the law despite the rigidity of 
the common-law courts.63 
Chancery also offered a much broader range of remedies than were 
available at law.64 Whereas Common Pleas could only issue a judgment that 
entitled the plaintiff to attempt to obtain a specified amount of money from 
the defendant, equity could issue injunctions that prohibited the defendant 
from taking certain acts or required him to do so.65 A court of equity could 
attempt to prevent harm before it even occurred, whereas the common law 
offered only an ex post remedy.66 Relief in equity thus tended to be specific, 
rather than substitutionary.67 
In 1528, Christopher St. Germain published Doctor and Student, a dia-
logue between a doctor of divinity and an English barrister, discussing the 
relationship between English law and personal conscience.68 The book of-
fered one of the first in-depth accounts of English equity and was among the 
most important compilations of English law prior to Blackstone’s Commen-
taries. St. Germain presented equity in terms of Aristotle’s conception of 
epieikeia.69 
                                                                                                                                       
 58 HOFFER, supra note 46, at 26; see also BAKER, supra note 47, at 118 (describing Chancery 
as “a court of conscience, in which defendants could be coerced into doing whatever conscience 
required in the full circumstances of the case”). 
 59 JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 49 (Books for Libraries Press 1972) (1855). 
 60 Kroger, supra note 57, at 1435. 
 61 HOFFER, supra note 46, at 29. 
 62 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 292; PLUCKNETT, supra note 31, at 688–89. 
 63 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 346–47. 
 64 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at *439. 
 65 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 458. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 5–6 (discussing difference between specific and substitu-
tionary relief). 
 68 See generally CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (1528). 
 69 See supra note 50.  
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By this time, the Chancery Court was limited to equitable jurisdiction; it 
could grant relief only when a party lacked an adequate remedy at law.70 The 
common law could be inadequate in many ways: a defendant may be too vio-
lent or powerful to sue in an ordinary court, the plaintiff might be unable to 
satisfy a technical element or evidentiary requirement for obtaining relief at 
law, the common law may lack a writ for the harm the plaintiff had suffered, a 
common-law jury could be prejudiced against the plaintiff, or the defendant 
may have subjected the plaintiff to multiple vexatious and frivolous suits at 
law.71 
In 1617, Bacon became the Lord Chancellor of England, and he sought 
to transform equity into a more predictable, consistent system of law. He 
compiled a code of 101 orders derived from earlier Chancery rulings to guide 
chancellors in the exercise of their equitable discretion.72 By using prior rul-
ings as precedents, he enabled legal reasoning in Chancery to more closely 
approximate the common-law courts and ensured greater consistency among 
decisions.73 As a result of Bacon’s reforms, attorneys practicing in Chancery 
began to cite cases.74 
During the English Civil War (1642-1651) and Interregnum (1649-
1660), Chancery was viewed with great suspicion. “As a prerogative court, it 
was subject to the same suspicion as its far more obnoxious and politically 
active counterpart, the Star Chamber.”75 Following the Restoration, Chancery 
became more conservative, curbing its discretion.76 After becoming Chancel-
lor in 1673, Lord Nottingham—whom Holdsworth calls the “Father of Mod-
ern Equity”77—compiled a manual of Chancery practice setting forth princi-
ples to guide and restrict the availability of equitable relief such as injunc-
tions. Though the manual itself was unpublished, Nottingham’s rulings as 
Chancellor were consistent with it. Holdsworth explains that Nottingham 
“began the work of organizing and systematizing the principles upon which 
the court acted; and, as a result of his work, equity began to assume its final 
                                                                                                                                       
 70 Raack, supra note 39, at 555. 
 71 Id. at 555–61 (collecting cases). 
 72 15 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 347–72 (J. Spedding ed. 1861); see also 5 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 193. 
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 75 HOFFER, supra note 46, at 28. 
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 77 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 150. 
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form.”78 Over the century that followed, the law of equity would become, in 
Holdsworth’s view, “completely fixed.”79 
Thus, over time, equity matured from a series of ad hoc, case-by-case 
rulings to a set of principles structurally similar to—although different in sub-
stance from—the common law. As a result of the efforts of Chancellors such 
as Bacon and Nottingham, English equity could accurately be characterized 
as a distinct body of law. Blackstone concluded that equity is a “connected 
system, governed by established rules, and bound down by precedents, from 
which [Chancellors] do not depart, although the reason of some of them may 
perhaps be liable to objection.”80 
II. AMERICAN EQUITY PRIOR TO ERIE 
The thirteen colonies adopted dramatically different approaches to equi-
ty.81 Several colonies, following the English model, established separate 
common-law and chancery courts,82 while others permitted their common-
law courts of general jurisdiction to entertain equitable claims, as well.83 
Some colonies entirely excluded equity from their judicial systems,84 instead 
allowing the governor and governor’s council to exercise the equity power.85 
Many Americans were deeply skeptical of the broad discretion entrusted to 
equity courts, finding the notion of equity antithetical to the rule of law. They 
regarded equitable discretion to temper or disregard legal principles “as an 
appanage of the Crown’s prerogative, and, therefore, inimical to their indi-
vidual liberties.”86  
                                                                                                                                       
 78 Id.; see also MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 312; Dennis R. Klinck, Lord Nottingham’s 
“Certain Measures,” 28 L. & HIST. REV. 711, 746 (2010) (discussing Nottingham’s efforts). 
 79 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 547. 
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 81 HOFFER, supra note 46, at 49–51. 
 82 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
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2018] The Federal Equity Power 231 
At the Constitutional Convention, the original draft of the Constitution 
did not contain any references to equity.87 The proposal to grant federal courts 
equity jurisdiction arose very late in the process, in late August. William 
Johnson “suggested[] that the judicial power ought to extend to equity as well 
as law.”88 George Read, a delegate from Maryland, “objected to vesting these 
powers in the same court.”89 Without further debate, the proposal passed by a 
vote of six states to two states.90 
A few opponents of the Constitution objected to the judiciary’s equity 
power during the ratification debates, but it was not a major flashpoint.91 One 
prominent Anti-Federalist, Brutus, warned that granting judges equitable 
powers would permit them to ignore the plain text of laws and constitutional 
provisions and enforce their personal will.92 Another cautioned that it was 
“dangerous” to “vest in the same judge power to decide on the law, and also 
general powers in equity; for if the law restrain him, he is only to step into his 
shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate.”93 
The Federalist Papers defended Article III’s jurisdictional grant over 
cases in equity by explaining that federal courts need the power to fairly ad-
judicate cases otherwise within their jurisdiction that involve “ingredients of 
fraud, accident, trust, or hardship.”94 Alexander Hamilton later elaborated, 
“The great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in extraordi-
nary cases, which are exceptions to general rules.”95 
For more than a century after the Founding, federal courts treated equity 
as an independent body of law they were required to apply, typically regard-
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232 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1 
less of state statutes or state court rulings to the contrary. They generally dis-
tinguished among four types of issues relating to equity to which different 
constitutional provisions, statutory restrictions, and other doctrines applied: 
jurisdictional, procedural, remedial, and substantive. Of course, the bounda-
ries among these categories often were indistinct and an equitable issue could 
implicate multiple categories. 
A. Equity Jurisdiction 
The Constitution provides that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction 
over cases and controversies “in Law and Equity.”96 Congress implemented 
this jurisdiction in section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,97 which gave fed-
eral circuit courts “original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the sev-
eral States,” over certain “suits of a civil nature at common law or in equi-
ty.”98 This jurisdictional grant extended to matters in which the amount in 
controversy exceeded $500, and either the Government was a plaintiff, an 
alien was a party, or the case involved litigants from different states.99 The 
Judiciary Act also authorized the Supreme Court to hear appeals from circuit 
courts in equity cases.100 
Section 16 of the Judiciary Act went on to limit the federal courts’ equi-
table jurisdiction, stating, “[S]uits in equity shall not be sustained in . . . 
courts of the United States, in any case where a plain, adequate and complete 
remedy may be had at law.”101 The Judiciary Act further provided that suits in 
equity were not to be tried by jury.102 These restrictions complemented the 
Seventh Amendment,103 which provides, “In Suits at common law, where the 
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
                                                                                                                                       
 96 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 97 Charles Warren’s magisterial work on the history of the Judiciary Act recounts the raucous 
debates in Congress surrounding the grant of equity jurisdiction to the federal courts. See Charles 
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 98 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789). 
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shall be preserved . . . .”104 The Seventh Amendment prohibits a federal court 
from hearing a case in equity when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at 
law, thereby preserving the defendant’s right to a jury trial for common law 
claims.105  
Together, the Judiciary Act and the Seventh Amendment created a reme-
dial hierarchy, institutionalizing a preference for legal relief in the federal 
courts;106 a claimant was relegated to legal, rather than equitable, relief when 
it was available.107 These provisions greatly limited the range of state laws 
and precedents a federal court sitting in equity would follow and required 
legal and equitable claims to be adjudicated on different “sides” of the 
court.108 
To determine whether a plaintiff’s claim—including claims arising un-
der state law—sounded in law or equity for purposes of section 16 of the Ju-
diciary Act and the Seventh Amendment, a federal court applied “the princi-
ples of common law and equity” from England.109 The federal judiciary’s 
equitable jurisdiction “embrac[ed] all the subjects of which the High Court of 
Chancery in England had judicial cognizance at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution.”110 Federal courts sitting in equity could therefore hear any 
equitable claims that could have been brought before the English Court of 
Chancery in 1789, even in states that had granted their law courts jurisdiction 
over some or all traditionally equitable claims111 or refused to recognize equi-
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691. 
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utes, 47 AM. L. REV. 190, 190 (1913); accord Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869) 
(“The equity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chan-
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 111 See Miss. Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 206 (1893) (holding that the plaintiff could pro-
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competent to give”); Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U.S. 574, 578, 579 (1893) (holding 
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ty at all.112 The Court repeatedly emphasized, “[T]he equity jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States cannot be impaired by the laws of the respective 
states in which they sit.”113 
Conversely, a federal court could not permit litigants to raise an equita-
ble claim114 or defense115 in an action at law, even when state courts would 
permit them to do so.116 Characterization of a claim or defense as legal or 
equitable depended on the historical practice of the English Court of Chan-
cery, rather than the rulings, jurisdictional limits, or practice of state courts.117 
Consequently, all federal district courts exercised the same equitable jurisdic-
tion, despite differences in state laws and state court rulings concerning equi-
ty.118 
                                                                                                                                       
that a federal court could entertain a bill in equity to enforce a mechanic’s lien, even though a state 
statute “provide[d] for an action at law” to enforce mechanic’s liens, because “foreclosure of a 
mechanic’s lien is essentially an equitable proceeding” and “a State, by prescribing an action at 
law to enforce even statutory rights, cannot oust a Federal court, sitting in equity, of its jurisdic-
tion to enforce such rights, provided they are of an equitable nature”); Payne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 
429–30 (holding that a federal court could exercise equity jurisdiction over a claim for an account-
ing against an estate administrator despite the fact that state law prohibited the state chancery 
court from hearing such claims and assigned exclusive jurisdiction to county probate courts). 
 112 Cohn, 150 U.S. at 205. 
 113 Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R.R, 120 U.S. 130, 138 (1887) (applying equitable tolling 
to state statute of limitations pursuant to federal equitable principles); see also Payne, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) at 430 (“The equity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is . . . subject to neither 
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17, at 589 (“State statutes affecting equity in its concurrent jurisdiction were early held to have no 
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 114 See Stratton v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 530, 534 (1932) (holding that a federal 
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remedy”); Matthews v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 521, 528–29 (1932) (same).  
 115 Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U.S. 536, 549–50 (1901) (holding that a shareholder could not 
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strong, 146 U.S. 499, 512 (1892) (holding that a federal court lacked jurisdiction to grant an equi-
table set–off in an action at law, even though state law abolished the distinction between law and 
equity); Robinson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 220, 223 (holding that the defendant could not assert 
equitable title to land in a common-law ejectment action in federal court). 
 116 See The Effect of State Statutes, supra note 17, at 194 (“[L]egal and equitable actions may 
not be united in the federal courts . . . .”). 
 117 Robinson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 222–23. 
 118 Payne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 430 (“The equity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts 
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different States of the Union.”); United States v. Howland & Allen, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115 
(1819) (holding that, because the Judiciary Act “confers the same chancery powers on all” federal 
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Similarly, when determining whether a litigant was barred from seeking 
equitable relief due to an adequate remedy at law, a federal court could con-
sider only whether a legal remedy either existed under English common law 
in 1789 or subsequently had been created by Congress.119 The adequacy of a 
litigant’s remedy at law, and hence the availability of federal equitable relief, 
did not depend on the remedies actually available to it under state law at the 
time of the lawsuit. Consequently, a plaintiff for whom a legal remedy would 
have existed in 1789 could not seek equitable relief in federal court, even if a 
state statute or judicial ruling authorized it.120 Conversely, a state statute or 
judicial ruling that created or recognized a new right that did not exist under 
English law at the time of the Constitution’s ratification could not preclude a 
plaintiff from seeking equitable relief that was otherwise available in federal 
court.121  
In many of these jurisdictional cases, the Court repeatedly emphasized 
that, because section 16 of the Judiciary Act established the federal judiciary’s 
equity jurisdiction, states could not expand or restrict that jurisdiction by rec-
ognizing new common-law rights or refusing to recognize traditional ones.122 
                                                                                                                                       
courts, a federal district court’s “jurisdiction in Massachusetts must be the same as in other 
states”). 
 119 McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201, 206 (1887) (“The adequate remedy at law, which is 
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rights created by the states” are unenforceable in federal court when they exceed the limits of 
federal courts’ equitable jurisdiction or violate the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trials for 
common-law claims); see also Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 379 (1893) 
(holding that a “simple contract creditor” may not seek equitable relief in federal court pursuant to 
a state statute, because “[t]he line of demarcation between equitable and legal remedies in the 
federal courts cannot be obliterated by state legislation”). 
 121 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 516 (1898), overruled in part on other grounds by Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 169 U.S. 418 (1942) (“One who is entitled to sue 
in the federal circuit court may invoke its jurisdiction in equity whenever the established princi-
ples and rules of equity permit such a suit in that court; and he cannot be deprived of that right by 
reason of his being allowed to sue at law in a state court on the same cause of action.”); McCo-
nihay, 121 U.S. at 206 (holding that a state statute creating a remedy at law of ejectment did not 
bar a federal court from entertaining a claim in equity to quiet title because “no change in state 
legislation giving . . . a remedy by action at law, can of itself curtail the jurisdiction in equity of 
the courts of the United States”); see also Howland & Allen, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 108 (holding 
that a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over an equitable claim, despite a state statute creat-
ing a remedy at law). 
 122 McConihay, 121 U.S. at 206 (holding that a state statute creating a cause of action at law 
“cannot have the effect to oust the jurisdiction in equity of the courts of the United States”); Rob-
inson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 222 (holding that states could not “extinguish . . . the exercise of 
equitable jurisdiction” by federal courts by recharacterizing or refusing to recognize equitable 
claims or defenses). 
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Thus, federal courts determined the scope of their equitable jurisdiction by 
reference to the historic jurisdiction of the English Court of Chancery as mod-
ified by federal statutes, and generally did not take into account state statutes 
and judicial rulings.123 
B. Equity Procedure 
Since the Founding, federal courts were never required to follow state-
court procedure in equity cases.124 The original Process Act, enacted just a 
week after the Judiciary Act in September 1789, provided that the “forms and 
modes of proceedings in causes of equity” in federal courts “shall be accord-
ing to the course of the civil law,”125 while the “modes of process” in “suits at 
common law” would be the procedures followed in the courts of each state as 
of 1789.126 Although this statute was a temporary measure that was supposed 
to expire at the end of Congress’s next session,127 Congress extended it twice, 
until 1792.128 
The Process Act of 1792 retained the same provisions for common-law 
cases, but directed federal courts sitting in equity to apply “the principles, 
rules and usages which belong to courts of equity” unless the Judiciary Act, 
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, or orders issued by individual 
courts specified otherwise.129 Notwithstanding this law, the “mode of proof” 
of witness examination was to be identical in all federal courts, including in 
“the trial of causes in equity.”130 
Shortly after the Process Act of 1792 was enacted, the Supreme Court 
issued an order declaring, “THE COURT considers the practice of the courts 
of King’s Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the prac-
tice of this court,” subject to future modification by the Court when neces-
                                                                                                                                       
 123 But see infra notes 172–181 and accompanying text (discussing the murky exception for 
state laws creating substantive rights). 
 124 Effect of State Laws, supra note 17, at 229 (“[A] change in the state law of procedure is 
ineffectual to alter the equity practice of the federal courts.”). 
 125 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 [hereinafter Original Process Act]. 
 126 Id. at 93; see also Kendall v. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 625 (1838) (recognizing that 
federal laws adopting state practices and processes have “always been considered as referring to 
the law existing at the time of adoption[,] and no subsequent legislation has ever been supposed to 
affect it”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 32 (1825) (“The [Original Process Act] 
adopts the State law as it then stood, not as it might afterwards be made.”). 
 127 Original Process Act, ch. 21, § 3, 1 Stat. at 94. 
 128 Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 191, 191 (1791); Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 13, 1 Stat. 
123, 123 (1790). 
 129 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. Additionally, the Judiciary Act also 
required judges sitting in equity to issue written factual findings to explain their judgments. Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, § 19, 1 Stat. at 83. 
 130 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 30, 1 Stat. at 88. 
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sary.131 In 1822,132 and again in 1842,133 the Supreme Court promulgated 
Federal Equity Rules to govern equity proceedings in the lower courts. Both 
sets of rules directed judges to follow the “practice of the High Court of 
Chancery in England” for any matters the rules themselves did not address.134 
Pursuant to the Process Act of 1792 and the Federal Equity Rules, feder-
al courts sitting in equity ignored state laws they deemed procedural135 and 
applied uniform, national rules instead.136 The Supreme Court repeatedly reit-
erated that, unless a federal rule provided otherwise, the equity side of federal 
courts was “regulated by the practice of the High Court of Chancery in Eng-
land, so far as it can be applied consistently with the local circumstances and 
convenience of the district where the court is held.”137 Federal courts sitting 
in equity likewise applied “principles of general equity jurisprudence” rather 
than state law to determine the admissibility of evidence.138 The Process Act 
of 1792 remained in effect for federal equity cases until the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938139 pursuant to the Rules Enabling 
Act.140 
                                                                                                                                       
 131 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413–14 (1792). 
 132 Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v, v–xiii 
(1822). 
 133 Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 42 U.S. (3 How.) xli, xli–
lxx (1842). 
 134 Id. at lxix, r. 90; Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 
Wheat.) at xiii, r. 33; see also Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 437 (1882) (holding that a federal 
court “is not governed in its practice in equity by the laws of the State in which it sits, but by the 
rules” promulgated by the Supreme Court, its own rules, and, “when these are silent, by the prac-
tice of the High Court of Chancery in England prevailing when the equity rules were adopted, so 
far as the same may reasonably be applied”). 
 135 Noonan v. Lee, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 499, 509 (1863) (holding that the rules of equity practice 
in federal courts are “unaffected by State legislation”). 
 136 Lehan Kent Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: “Substance” and “Procedure” After 
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271, 271 (1939). 
 137 Clark v. Rayburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 318, 323 (1869) (applying traditional English rules for 
redemption of equity); accord Thompson v. R.R. Cos., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1868). 
 138 Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 147 (1851) (“This being a suit in equity, and 
oral evidence being admitted, or rejected, not by the mere force of any state statute, but upon the 
principles of general equity jurisprudence, this court must be governed by its own views of those 
principles.”). 
 139 See Cross, supra note 20, at 177 n.25. 
 140 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). The Conformity Act of 
1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872), directed federal courts sitting at law to apply state 
court procedure as it existed at the time of the case, rather than as it existed in 1789 as required by 
the Process Act of 1792, see supra notes 126, 129 and accompanying text. The Conformity Act 
did not modify the Process Act’s requirements for cases in equity. 
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C. Equitable Remedies 
Since the Founding, the Supreme Court has repeatedly directed federal 
courts to apply equitable principles derived from the English Court of Chan-
cery to determine whether a litigant is entitled to equitable relief. This re-
quirement, known as the “equitable remedial rights doctrine,”141 applied 
equally in federal question and diversity cases.142 Federal courts applied these 
traditional “principles of equity” even when they conflicted with the “peculiar 
statute enactments of the state.”143 
Uniform, federally established equitable standards governed all aspects 
of injunctive relief in both federal question and diversity cases, including 
whether such relief was available in a particular case,144 the court’s ability to 
impose conditions on an injunction,145 the injunction’s effects,146 and the 
                                                                                                                                       
 141 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 142 Hart, supra note 20, at 511 (“For a century and a half the lower federal courts, sitting in 
equity, had administered a uniform system of federal equitable remedies drawn from the remedies 
developed by the English chancellors.”); State Laws in Federal Courts of Equity, supra note 17, at 
589–90 (stating that remedies in federal courts sitting in equity “cannot be controlled by State 
laws” because federal courts “occupy the field of equitable rights according to their own rules” 
and “determine what are the boundaries of that field”); see also Tunks, supra note 136, at 275 
(“[N]o state statute widening the scope of equitable ‘remedies’ could be given effect in federal 
courts.”); Collier, supra note 17, at 335 (recognizing that enforcement of “new equitable rights . . . 
has in some instances been denied in federal courts”); Effect of State Laws, supra note 17, at 232 
(claiming that the principle that federal courts must apply equity as administered by the English 
Court of Chancery “applies to the remedy only and not to the right”); The Effect of State Statutes, 
supra note 17, at 195 (recognizing that federal courts sitting in equity will not enforce new reme-
dial rights created by state law). 
 143 Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 (1832); accord Robinson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 
at 222–23 (“[R]emedies in the courts of the United States, are to be, at common law or in equity, 
not according to the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common law and 
equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of those 
principles.”); see also Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 114 (1915) (“[T]he remedies afforded . . . in 
the Federal courts, sitting as courts of equity, are not determined by local laws or rules of decision, 
but by general principles, rules, and usages of equity having uniform operation in those courts 
wherever sitting.”). 
 144 Guffey, 237 U.S. at 114 (upholding the availability of injunctive relief to leaseholders even 
though their option to surrender the lease rendered it unenforceable in state court under state law 
due to the lack of mutuality of obligation). It appears the first time the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the requirements for injunctive relief in federal court was in Georgia v. Brails-
ford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792), a case arising under state law. The Justices filed seriatim opin-
ions, but each rested his analysis—without citation—on traditional equitable principles. See, e.g., 
id. at 405 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“In order to support a motion for an injunction, the bill should 
set forth a case of probable right, and a probable danger that the right would be defeated, without 
this special interposition of the court.”). 
 145 Russell, 105 U.S. at 438 (“The power to impose such conditions [on injunctions] is found-
ed upon, and arises from, the discretion which the court has in such cases, to grant, or not to grant, 
the injunction applied for. It is a power inherent in the court, as a court of equity, and has been 
exercised from time immemorial.”). 
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availability of damages under an injunction bond.147 Consequently, a federal 
court could issue an injunction in a diversity case that would have been una-
vailable in state court, while denying injunctive relief that a state court would 
have granted.148 Federal courts likewise applied their own body of equitable 
principles to a wide range of other remedial issues in the cases before them, 
including equitable tolling, even where state courts had held their statutes of 
limitations could not be tolled;149 laches, in cases in which state-law statute of 
limitations had not expired;150 imposition of constructive trusts;151 seizures of 
property;152 and the appointment of receivers.153 Remedial rights could be 
neither “enlarged”154 nor reduced by state laws. 
                                                                                                                                       
 146 Boyle, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 655 (holding that an injunction prohibiting the seizure of goods 
that was issued after the goods had already been seized to satisfy a judgment did not prevent their 
sale). 
 147 Russell, 105 U.S. at 445–46. 
 148 See Hill, supra note 20, at 1028 (“[I]n respect of a cause of action founded upon state 
substantive law, the federal equity courts asserted the right to grant an equitable remedy in general 
conformity with traditional English chancery practice even though such remedy might not be 
available in the courts of the state; and similarly an equity remedy available in the courts of the 
state would be denied by the federal courts if not conforming to traditional English chancery prac-
tice.” (footnote omitted)); The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, supra note 12, at 836. As 
discussed earlier, federal courts would refuse to apply state statutes authorizing injunctive relief 
for plaintiffs who had an adequate remedy at law. Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford Cty., 281 U.S. 
121, 125–28 (1930) (holding that a plaintiff could not seek an injunction in federal court pursuant 
to a state statute against a county’s allegedly unconstitutional collection of taxes, because the 
plaintiff could have simply paid the taxes and sought a refund); see also supra notes 119–120 and 
accompanying text. 
 149 Kirby, 120 U.S. at 136 (“[I]t is an established rule of equity, as administered in the courts 
of the United States, that, where relief is asked on the ground of actual fraud, especially if such 
fraud has been concealed, time will not run in favor of the defendant until the discovery of the 
fraud, or until, with reasonable diligence, it might have been discovered.”). 
 150 Alsop v. Riker, 155 U.S. 448, 461 (1894) (“[E]quity in the exercise of its inherent power 
to do justice between parties, will, when justice demands it, refuse relief, even if the time elapsed 
without suit is less than that prescribed by the statute of limitations.”) 
 151 Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U.S. 603, 604, 609, 612 (1893) (holding that a 
plaintiff with unliquidated claims against corporations that had disbursed their assets to sharehold-
ers and ceased operations could not sue those shareholders in equity to recover the corporations’ 
assets under a constructive trust theory without first obtaining a judgment at law against the corpo-
rations). 
 152 Hollins, 150 U.S. at 379 (“[C]reditors cannot come into a court of equity to obtain the 
seizure of the property of their debtor . . . notwithstanding [that] a statute of the state may author-
ize such a proceeding in the courts of the state,” because “[t]he line of demarcation between equi-
table and legal remedies in the federal courts cannot be obliterated by state legislation.”). 
 153 Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 36 (1935) (holding, in a diversity case where the 
plaintiffs sought appointment of a receiver, that the district court should have “determined wheth-
er, in accordance with the accepted principles of equity,” the situation “called for the exercise of 
its extraordinary powers”); Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 348, 355–56 (1932) (applying the 
“rule in the federal courts” that “a creditor who seeks the appointment of receivers must reduce his 
claim to a judgment and exhaust his remedy at law,” even though the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act “may have relaxed that requirement in many of the states”); Pusey & Jones Co. v. 
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A pair of Supreme Court cases clearly illustrate the effects of the equita-
ble remedial rights doctrine. In 1915, in Guffey v. Smith, the Court awarded 
injunctive relief in a diversity case despite state supreme court precedents 
holding that state law rendered such relief unavailable under the circumstanc-
es.155 The plaintiff, a leaseholder of an oil and gas field, sued in federal court 
to enjoin competitors from attempting to drill for oil in the field under a sub-
sequent, allegedly invalid lease.156 Under state law, the plaintiff was entitled 
to sue only for damages and could not “directly or indirectly enforc[e] [its 
lease] in equity” because it contained a provision allowing the plaintiff to 
terminate it.157 The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the plaintiff could 
seek injunctive relief in federal court because “it has long been settled that the 
remedies afforded . . . in the Federal courts, sitting as courts of equity, are not 
determined by local laws or rules of decision, but by general principles, rules, 
and usages of equity having uniform operation in those courts wherever sit-
ting.”158 
Conversely, in the 1923 case Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, the Court 
refused to follow a state law authorizing a type of equitable relief unavailable 
in the English Court of Chancery.159 A Delaware statute allowed an unsecured 
creditor of an insolvent corporation to seek appointment of a receiver.160 The 
plaintiff sued under the statute in federal court to have a receiver appointed 
for the defendant, but the Supreme Court ultimately refused.161 It held that, 
under general equitable principles, “an unsecured simple contract creditor 
has . . . no substantive right, legal or equitable, in or to the property of his 
debtor.”162 The Court refused to implement the Delaware statute because it 
conflicted with those principles.163 It explained: 
That a remedial right to proceed in a federal court sitting in equity 
cannot be enlarged by a state statute is likewise clear . . . . The fed-
                                                                                                                                       
Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497 (1923) (discussing general equitable principles governing the ap-
pointment of receivers). 
 154 Pusey & Jones Co., 261 U.S. at 497. 
 155 237 U.S. at 108. 
 156 Id. at 110, 114. 
 157 Id. at 114 (holding that the lease was “so lacking in mutuality” under state law, because 
the lessee had the “option to surrender it,” that the lessee could not “directly or indirectly enforc[e] 
it in equity” in state court). 
 158 Id.; see also Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 221 (1809) (holding that a federal 
court sitting in equity must adjudicate disputes “in conformity with the settled principles of a court 
of chancery,” which may require granting relief that “is not given by statute”). 
 159 261 U.S. at 494–95. 
 160 Id. at 494 (citing DEL. CODE § 3883 (1915)). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 497. 
 163 Id. at 497–98. 
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eral court may therefore be obliged to deny an equitable remedy 
which the plaintiff might have secured in a state court. . . . [B]e-
cause that which the statute confers is merely a remedy, the statute 
cannot affect proceedings in the federal courts sitting in equity.164 
Thus, federal courts effectively applied the equitable equivalent of general 
law, rather than state law, for all remedial issues in equity cases. 
D. Equity and Substantive Rights 
“[S]ettled principles of equity,”165 rather than state statutes or court rul-
ings,166 presumptively governed the substantive aspects of both federal ques-
tion and diversity cases brought on the equity side of federal courts, as 
well.167 It was for the federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court “in the 
last resort, to decide what those principles are, and to apply such of them, to 
each particular case, as they may find justly applicable . . . .”168 The Court 
frequently emphasized that equity was “uniform[]” and “the rule of decision 
is the same in all” federal courts sitting in equity.169 Accordingly, federal 
courts crafted their own standards for entire fields of law deemed to be equi-
table, such as trusts.170 
                                                                                                                                       
 164 Id. at 497–98, 499 (citations omitted); see also Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 152 
(1891) (dismissing a diversity suit in equity to quiet title to a parcel of land brought by an alleged 
landowner who was not in possession of it, despite a state statute expressly authorizing such 
claims, because he had an adequate remedy at law in the form of an ejectment action). 
 165 Kirby, 120 U.S. at 137; accord Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 604 (1859) (Dan-
iel, J., dissenting); see also Collins, supra note 20, at 254, 265 (“[F]ederal courts generally applied 
a uniform body of nonstate, judge-made equity principles with respect to . . . in certain instances[] 
the primary rights and liabilities of litigants.”); Main, supra note 85, at 469 (“[T]he federal courts 
enunciated their own views of the principles of equity jurisprudence, without restriction by the 
decisions of state courts.”). 
 166 Burrill v. Locomobile Co., 258 U.S. 34, 38 (1922) (recognizing that “the laws of the States 
are the rules of decision” in common law cases in federal court, but equity “follows its own rules”). 
 167 See, e.g., Cates v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451, 457 (1893) (holding that, under a general equitable 
principles, a plaintiff may not sue in equity to set aside a defendant’s allegedly fraudulent convey-
ance without first obtaining a judgment at law against the defendant for breach of contract). 
 168 Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268, 272 (1852); accord Guffey, 237 U.S. at 114. 
 169 Boyle, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 654, 658 (emphasis added); accord Howland & Allen, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) at 115 (holding that the Judiciary Act “confers the same chancery powers on all [federal 
courts], and gives the same rule of decision”); see also Kirby, 120 U.S. at 138 (holding that the 
“rules and principles” that federal courts apply are “alike in every state”); Neves, 54 U.S. (13 
How.) at 272 (holding that “the same principles of equity” would apply to a federal case, regard-
less of the district in which it were filed); von Moschzisker, supra note 17, at 300; State Statutes 
and the Federal Equity Courts, supra note 17, at 688. 
 170 Neves, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 273 (applying federal standards to determine whether a trust 
was formed). 
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Congress could displace such principles through a sufficiently clear stat-
ute.171 Federal courts also would, in theory, apply state statutes creating new 
substantive equitable rights.172 For example, in its 1839 Clark v. Smith deci-
sion, the Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff who held legal title to, and was 
in possession of, a parcel of land could sue in equity in federal court to quiet 
title against “any other person setting up a claim.”173 Such a plaintiff could 
not have brought a bill to quiet title in the English Court of Chancery without 
first obtaining successive judgments in his favor concerning the land.174 The 
Supreme Court nevertheless held that the suit was permissible under a state 
statute creating the right to bring such claims.175 
Notwithstanding cases like Clark, federal courts often avoided applying 
state statutes in equity cases on the grounds that they were procedural or re-
medial,176 affected the federal courts’ equitable jurisdiction,177 or would vio-
                                                                                                                                       
 171 Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836) (“The great principles of equity, secur-
ing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.”); see also 
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164–65 (1939) (holding that federal courts sitting in 
equity must apply “that body of remedies, procedures and practices which theretofore had been 
evolved in the English Court of Chancery, subject, of course, to modifications by Congress” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 172 Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 557 (1923) (“[W]hile the power of the courts of the 
United States to entertain suits in equity and to decide them cannot be abridged by state legisla-
tion, the rights involved therein may be the proper subject of such legislation.”); see, e.g., Reyn-
olds v. Crawfordsville First Nat’l Bank, 112 U.S. 405, 410 (1884) (holding that a federal court 
must “look to the legislation of the State in which the court sits to ascertain what constitutes a 
cloud upon the title [to land]”); see also Tunks, supra note 136, at 271 (“It was said that state 
statutes might create ‘substantive rights’ which federal courts could recognize and enforce.”); The 
Effect of State Statutes, supra note 17, at 194 (“[W]here the state law provides for an enlargement 
of equitable rights, the federal courts will in the exercise of their already existing powers enforce 
the rights thus created.”). 
 173 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 202 (1839). 
 174 See Scott, 140 U.S. at 115.  
 175 Clark, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 203 (holding that, the state “having created a right . . . no reason 
exists why it should not be pursued in the same form as . . . in the State courts”); see also Mason, 
260 U.S. at 558 (applying a statute “establish[ing] a measure of damages” that applied to both 
common law and equity suits, because it had “nothing to do with the general principles of equi-
ty”); Brine v. Ins. Co., 96 U.S. 627, 634 (1877) (holding that a federal court sitting in diversity 
must enforce a state statute creating a right of redemption in foreclosure proceedings, even though 
the English Court of Chancery did not historically recognize such a defense). 
 176 Pusey & Jones Co., 261 U.S. at 500 (holding that, where a state statute “confers . . . a 
substantive right,” a litigant in diversity “is entitled to the aid of the federal court for its enforce-
ment,” but where the statute “is held merely to enlarge the equitable remedy, it will not support a 
bill in equity in the federal court”); see also McCormick & Hewins, supra note 113, at 140 
(“[S]ubstantive rights (as distinguished from merely remedial ones) created by state statutes will 
be enforced in equity in the Federal courts . . . .”); Effect of State Laws, supra note 17, at 228 
(claiming that the principle that federal courts must apply equity as administered by the English 
Court of Chancery “applies to the remedy only and not to the right”); Equity Jurisdiction, supra 
note 17, at 48. 
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late the Seventh Amendment if enforced in federal court.178 These restrictions 
collectively limited the states’ power to create new substantive rights that fed-
eral courts would enforce in equity in often unpredictable and even arbitrary-
seeming ways.179 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 1842 Swift decision,180 
federal courts were most willing to apply state laws in equity cases they 
deemed purely local,181 but federal standards still largely occupied the field.  
Thus, throughout more than half of American history, the states’ power 
to adopt substantive law enforceable in a federal court sitting in equity was 
highly circumscribed. 
                                                                                                                                       
 177 See, e.g., Hollins, 150 U.S. at 379 (“[Simple contract] creditors cannot come into a court 
of equity to obtain the seizure of the property of their debtor . . . notwithstanding a statute of the 
state may authorize such a proceeding in the courts of the state. The line of demarcation between 
equitable and legal remedies in the federal courts cannot be obliterated by state legislation.”); 
Scott, 140 U.S. at 115 (refusing to allow a plaintiff in a federal diversity case to proceed in equity 
under a state law allowing contractual creditors to seek equitable relief); Whitehead, 138 U.S. 146 
(refusing to allow a plaintiff in a federal diversity case to proceed in equity under a state law al-
lowing a defendant in possession of land to be sued in equity to quiet title to it); see also McCor-
mick & Hewins, supra note 113, at 140; von Moschzisker, supra note 17, at 300; Effect of State 
Laws, supra note 17, at 231; Equity Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at 48. 
 178 See Keller, supra note 110, at 192 (declaring that federal courts would enforce “new equi-
table rights created by State statutes,” except where the Seventh Amendment prohibited it); Tunks, 
supra note 136, at 271 (“If the statute were ‘substantive,’ it would be given effect in the federal 
courts, but no state statute considered to narrow the right to jury trial as protected by the Seventh 
Amendment would be honored.”). 
 179 See von Moschzisker, supra note 17, at 300 (“[I]t becomes an important question to de-
termine whether a particular state enactment deals with substantive rights or privileges or with 
only remedial rights.”); Effect of State Laws, supra note 17, at 30 (arguing that, when state statutes 
create substantive rights, “the authorities present no well defined limits to the rule that equity will 
exercise that, and only that, jurisdiction possessed in 1789”); Equity Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at 
49 (suggesting that some Supreme Court rulings enforcing state–created equitable rights concern-
ing wills fail to account for certain limits the Court had placed on the application of state laws and 
precedents in equity). 
 180 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. 
 181Mason, 260 U.S. at 558 (applying state statute governing damages in a claim for conver-
sion brought in equity because “[t]he entire cause of action is . . . local,” involving “title to land 
and seeking an injunction against continuing trespasses”); Clark, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 203 (holding 
that “propriety and convenience suggest” that equitable rights and remedies “should not materially 
differ” between federal and state court “where titles to lands are the subjects of investigation”); 
see also McCormick & Hewins, supra note 113, at 140 (“Seemingly, also, the courts in equity, as 
at law, would defer to local substantive decisional rules . . . [that] constitute a local rule of proper-
ty or a peculiar local usage.”); Tunks, supra note 136, at 285 (“[W]hile the federal equity jurisdic-
tion has been administered independently for the most part, there has been reference to state stat-
ute and common law in ‘local’ matters . . . .” (citing Mason, 260 U.S. at 558)); State Laws in Fed-
eral Courts of Equity, supra note 17, at 590. 
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III. EQUITY IN THE POST-ERIE WORLD 
This Part explores the Supreme Court’s refusal to fully reassess its con-
ception of the federal equity power in light of Erie. Section A compares the 
federal equity power to “general law,” which Erie repudiated.182 Section B 
discusses how, in Guaranty Trust v. York,183 the Supreme Court refused to 
apply Erie to equitable remedies in federal court.184 
A. Erie and General Law 
From the Founding Era through Erie, the Supreme Court repeatedly af-
firmed the prerogative of federal courts sitting in equity to apply a unique 
body of principles derived from the English Court of Chancery. This power 
could be limited only by Congress or the highly circumscribed prerogative of 
states to create new substantive rights not traditionally recognized in equi-
ty.185 Equity came to resemble the “general law” that federal courts applied 
on the common law side of their dockets.186 
General law was often treated as a transcendental body of universal 
principles that was not imposed by, and did not receive its binding force from, 
any particular sovereign.187 Federal courts viewed it as “the product of reason 
and the common practices of the civilized world.”188 Blackstone referred to it 
as a “great universal law.”189 Federal courts exercised their “independent 
judgment” in crafting general law190—though they would have described 
their adjudicative process as “discovering” or “applying” general law—rather 
than following state law.191 
                                                                                                                                       
 182 See infra notes 185–210 and accompanying text. 
 183 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 184 See infra notes 211–227 and accompanying text. 
 185 See supra notes 171–181 and accompanying text. 
 186 Hill, supra note 20, at 1050 (“Swift v. Tyson stood for a philosophy of law which had sub-
stantially the same implications on the equity side of the federal courts as on the law side . . . .”); 
McCormick & Hewins, supra note 113, at 140 (explaining that several cases “support[] the view 
that substantive equity law is treated in the Federal courts as a matter of ‘general law’ not con-
trolled by state decisions”); cf. Main, supra note 85, at 469 (arguing that Swift v. Tyson was “ex-
ten[ded] . . . to equity cases in 1851” (citing Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139 (1851))). 
 187 William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1984). 
 188 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 655, 664 (2013); see also Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 102 (explaining that, 
when applying general law, “federal courts deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and 
therefore Law, required wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law”). 
 189 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at *67. 
 190 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370–71 (1893). 
 191 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842) (holding that, when applying general 
law, federal courts “ascertain[] upon general reasoning and legal analogies . . . what is the just rule 
furnished by the [applicable legal] principles . . . to govern the case”). 
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As its name suggests, general law governed “questions of a more gen-
eral nature” in federal courts, such as “the construction of ordinary contracts 
or other written instruments, and especially . . . questions of general commer-
cial law . . . .”192 State courts were not bound to apply the federal judiciary’s 
view of general law, however, as thy were with federal statutes and federal 
common law. Rather, state courts could adopt their own, contrary interpreta-
tions of general law as part of their state common law.193 Consequently, the 
law governing a dispute—general law or state law—often depended entirely 
on whether the case was litigated in federal or state court, potentially leading 
to completely different results based solely on choice of forum. 
General law was subject to two major limits. First, it did not reach mat-
ters governed by local law,194 which included to state statutes and court rul-
ings concerning real property or other purely internal matters that lacked in-
terstate ramifications.195 Over time, however, federal courts held that general 
law, rather than local law, applied to an increasingly large range of matters 
including torts, agency, punitive damages, and even some property rights.196 
Second, section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,197 commonly referred 
to as the Rules of Decision Act, required federal courts to apply state stat-
utes—though not state judicial rulings—in diversity cases and other disputes 
arising under state law. The Rules of Decision Act provided that “the laws of 
the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common 
law” in federal courts “in cases where they apply,” unless the U.S. Constitu-
tion, a federal law, or a treaty provided otherwise.198 The Supreme Court in-
terpreted the phrase “the laws of the several states” as referring exclusively to 
                                                                                                                                       
 192 Id.; see also Fletcher, supra note 187, at 1519 (“In questions of commercial law, the deci-
sions of Courts, in all civilized, and commercial nations, are to be regarded, for the purpose of 
establishing uniform principles in the commercial world.” (quoting ZECHARIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST 
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES. AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EX-
CHANGE, AND PROMISSORY NOTES, at ix (Hartford 1810))). 
       193 Bellia & Clark, supra note 188, at 679. 
 194 See Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492, 498 (1890) (“There should be, in all matters of a 
local nature, but one law within the State, and that law is not what this court might determine, but 
what the supreme court of the State has determined.”). 
 195 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18 (holding that federal courts are required to apply state statutes 
and court rulings concerning “rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as . . . 
real estate, and other matters immovable and intra–territorial in their nature and character”); Jack-
son v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1827) (“[W]here any principle of law, establishing a 
rule of real property, has been settled in the State Courts, the same rule will be applied by this 
Court that would be applied by the State tribunals.”); see also Fletcher, supra note 187, at 1532–
33. 
 196 Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1294 (2007); 
Bellia & Clark, supra note 188, at 698; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75–76 
(1938); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 149 U.S. at 376–77. 
 197 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). 
 198 Id. 
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state statutes199 and state court rulings interpreting those statutes.200 By enact-
ing a statute, a state could “localize” an area of general law, forcing federal 
courts to apply the rule crafted by the legislature instead of general law.201 
The Court explained that the Rules of Decision Act did not extend to state 
courts’ common-law rulings because, “[i]n the ordinary use of language, it 
will hardly be contended, that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They 
are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are not, of themselves, 
laws.”202 
In 1938, in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court concluded that 
this interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act was incorrect and unconstitu-
tional.203 Erie held that the Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act require 
federal courts to apply both state statutes and state judicial precedents—
including exclusively common-law rulings—in diversity cases and other mat-
ters arising under state law.204 The Court held there is no such thing as “gen-
eral law,” in the sense of a “transcendental body of law outside of any particu-
lar State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.”205 In 
misleadingly overbroad language, it further declared that federal courts lack 
power to create federal common law.206 Applying either general law or feder-
                                                                                                                                       
 199 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18 (“The laws of a state are more usually understood to mean 
the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long-established local 
customs having the force of laws.”); see also Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361, 367 (1826) 
(recognizing the obligation of federal courts to apply state statutes in diversity cases). 
 200 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18 (holding that federal courts are required to apply “the positive 
statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals”); Elmendorf v. 
Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825) (discussing “the principle, supposed to be universally 
recognised, that the judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the 
appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government”); see also Green v. Les-
see of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 298 (1832) (holding that federal courts are required to follow a 
state court’s interpretation of a state statute, even when the state court overturned an earlier inter-
pretation). The Court required federal courts to defer to state courts’ interpretations of state laws 
“to preserve uniformity,” because disparate interpretations of a state’s laws by state and federal 
courts would produce “the greatest mischief and confusion.” Jackson, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 167; 
see also M’Keen v. Delancy’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22, 32 (1809). 
 201 Fletcher, supra note 187, at 1527; Hill, supra note 20, at 443; Ernest A. Young, A General 
Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 35 (2013). 
 202 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19. 
 203 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938), overruling Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. 
 204 Id. at 78 (“[W]hether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or 
by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”). 
 205 Id. at 79 (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370–72 (1910) (Holmes J., 
dissenting)). 
 206 Id. at 78 (stating that “no clause in the Constitution purports to confer” upon federal courts 
the power to “declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state”). Ironically, the same 
day the Court handed down Erie, it also issued its opinion in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & 
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 102–03, 106 (1938), which relied in part on federal com-
mon law to determine states’ respective rights to a river that partly divided them. See Jay Tid-
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al common law to a case on the grounds that a particular field does not quali-
fy as “local” violates the states’ constitutionally protected powers.207 
Erie went on to lament the “mischievous results” that arose from federal 
courts’ reliance on general law rather than state law in diversity cases.208 Out-
of-state parties involved in litigation against a state’s citizens could often ob-
tain different results from federal courts applying general law than similarly 
situated litigants who were citizens of the forum state would receive from 
state courts applying state law.209 Such differences were unjust and encour-
aged forum shopping. The Court also opined that general law tended to be 
highly subjective, with cases turning on “what the judge advancing the doc-
trine thinks at the time should be the general law on a particular subject.”210 
B. Guaranty Trust and Equity 
One might have reasonably expected Erie to be the death knell for tradi-
tional notions of the federal equity power. Justice Frankfurter expressly de-
clared that, prior to Erie, courts held “the same view[]” of common law and 
equity cases.211 Indeed, the Court went so far as to refer to its body of federal 
equitable principles as “the common law of chancery.”212 And shortly after 
Erie, the Court recognized that the reasoning underlying that case applies 
with equal force to equity.213 Nevertheless, in 1945, the Court in Guaranty 
                                                                                                                                       
marsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 597–98 
(2006).  
 207 Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. Some language from this portion of the ruling appears to invoke the 
“reserved powers” doctrine under the Tenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court later repudiat-
ed. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (rejecting the notion that the Tenth 
Amendment limits Congress’ enumerated powers by carving out a sphere of exclusive state au-
thority); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) (hold-
ing that the Tenth Amendment does not prohibit the federal government from regulating essential 
state functions). 
 208 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. 
 209 Id. at 74–75, 78. 
 210 Id. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 149 U.S. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting)). 
 211 Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 n.1 (1945). 
 212 Id. 
 213 Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938) (“The decision in Erie . . . applies 
though the question of construction arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in equity.”). Some 
critics maintain that Erie’s constitutional holdings were dicta and that the Court should have ruled 
exclusively on statutory grounds by reinterpreting the Rules of Decision Act. See, e.g., Charles E. 
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 
YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946); McCormick & Hewins, supra note 113, at 134. Ruhlin confirms, how-
ever, that Erie’s constitutional analysis was a binding part of the ruling. See 304 U.S. at 205. Ruh-
lin was a case in equity but, at the time, the Rules of Decision Act applied only “in trials at com-
mon law.” Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92 (1789). Consequently, Erie’s constitutional 
holdings were the only parts of that case applicable in Ruhlin. 
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Trust Co. v. York confirmed that federal law still governs equitable remedies 
in federal court.214 
Guaranty Trust considered whether a federal court sitting in diversity 
was required to apply a state statute of limitations to an equitable claim for 
breach of trust.215 Many passages in the opinion suggest that the Court would 
decline to apply independent federal equitable principles in state-law cases. 
For example, the Court stated, “[A] federal court adjudicating a State-created 
right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that 
purpose, in effect, only another court of the State.”216 A federal court sitting in 
equity therefore generally cannot “deny substantive rights created by State 
law” or “create substantive rights denied by State law.”217 
The Court went on to hold, however, that traditional principles of equity 
from the English Court of Chancery continue to govern equitable remedies in 
federal courts, even in diversity cases.218 It explained, “Equitable relief in a 
federal court . . . must be within the traditional scope of equity as historically 
evolved in the English Court of Chancery . . . .”219 The Court elaborated: 
That a State may authorize its courts to give equitable relief un-
hampered by any or all such restrictions cannot remove these fet-
ters from the federal courts. State law cannot define the remedies 
which a federal court must give simply because a federal court in 
diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal to the 
State’s courts. Contrariwise, a federal court may afford an equitable 
remedy for a substantive right recognized by a State even though a 
State court cannot give it.220 
Thus, Guaranty Trust maintains the equitable remedial rights doctrine 
for state-law cases. Pursuant to Erie, state law governs substantive rights in 
diversity and supplemental jurisdiction221 cases in equity,222 but federal courts 
                                                                                                                                       
 214 326 U.S. at 99. 
 215 Id. at 101. 
 216 Id. at 108. 
 217 Id. at 105; see also id. at 108–09. 
 218 Id. at 108. 
 219 Id. at 105. 
 220 Id. at 106 (internal citations omitted). 
 221 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (holding that Erie applies equally whether a 
federal court is exercising “diversity or pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims”). 
 222 Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 106 (holding that, when adjudicating equity cases arising 
under state law, federal courts “enforce[] State-created substantive rights,” but do so subject to 
“the traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure”); see Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. 
Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (holding that state law governs the allocation of burdens of 
proof for causes of action in equity, because burdens of proof affect “substan[tive] right[s]” and 
are among the “assurance[s]” that the law provides to right-holders); Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 205, 209 
(holding that the Erie Doctrine requires a federal court to “apply the entire body of substantive law 
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must disregard both state statutes and judicial rulings of a “mere remedial 
character.”223 Federal equitable principles continue to govern the availability 
of equitable relief in cases arising under state law.224 In the 1941 case Kel-
leam v. Maryland Casualty Co., for example, the Supreme Court overturned 
the district court’s appointment of a receiver because, although the ruling was 
proper under state law, it violated federal equitable principles.225 Despite 
Erie’s purported abolition of general law and relegation of federal common 
law to a few distinct areas in which federal interests predominate,226 equity 
lingers as a vestigial “brooding omnipresence”227 that may dictate the results 
of diversity and supplemental jurisdiction cases. 
IV. A NEW THEORY OF EQUITY 
Erie heralded the end of general law in federal diversity cases. Some 
commentators, such as Professor Arthur Corbin, simply assumed without ex-
tensive analysis that Erie also eliminated federal equity as an independent 
body of law that federal courts must apply in all cases.228 Guaranty Trust 
purported to extend Erie to equity cases, but preserved the “equitable remedi-
al rights doctrine” that requires federal courts to apply a uniform body of fed-
eral equitable principles derived from the English Court of Chancery in de-
                                                                                                                                       
governing an identical action in the state courts,” even for a “question of [statutory] construction 
[that] arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in equity”). 
 223 Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 108 (quoting Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford Cty., 281 U.S. 
121, 128 (1930)). 
 224 Id. at 105.  
 225 312 U.S. 377, 381–82 (1941). One author dismisses Kelleam, noting the Court’s alternate 
holding that the case should have been dismissed as a matter of comity because it concerned real 
property that was the subject of litigation in state court. Past and Present, supra note 12, at 841 
(citing Kelleam, 312 U.S. at 382). 
 226 See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308, 310 (1947). 
 227 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 228 Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 764 (1941) (“[I]t 
appears that the Supreme Court informs the federal judges that hereafter, in all cases that are to be 
decided by the unwritten common law or equity, they must look for that law within the confines of 
some one state; and finding it there, they must not disapprove it as unsound or incorrect, but must 
apply it to the case before them even though they are sure that it is contrary to the common law 
inherited by us from England, . . . or to supposed principles of general jurisprudence and jus-
tice.”); see also Hart, supra note 20, at 511–12 (suggesting that the post-Erie Court would likely 
reject the equitable remedial rights doctrine because its Erie jurisprudence focuses primarily on 
preserving uniformity of outcome between state and federal courts); McCormick & Hewins, supra 
note 113, at 140 (“[T]here seems no escape from a similar conclusion in equity. The constitution 
can hardly be said to have conferred any greater power on Federal judges to make state equity law 
than to make state common law.”); Tunks, supra note 136, at 285 (“Certainly, the arguments in 
the Tompkins case apply equally to equity. Because a doctrine had its roots in the chancery office, 
it is no less discriminatory to apply different versions in state and federal courts than it would be 
to apply different rules of law.”). 
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ciding whether to grant equitable relief.229 There is no basis under the Consti-
tution, federal law, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for federal courts 
to apply a freestanding, independent body of equitable principles to resolve 
all remedial issues that come before them, including in cases that arise under 
state law. 
Section A of this Part explains that the Rules Enabling Act is inapposite 
because none of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth substantive 
standards governing equitable relief.230 Section B shows that the Rules of 
Decision Act requires federal courts to apply state statutes and court rulings in 
deciding whether to award equitable relief in cases arising under state law, 
because such remedial issues are substantive rather than procedural.231 Sec-
tion C goes on to demonstrate that the Constitution does not authorize federal 
courts to craft a freestanding body of equitable remedial principles to apply in 
both federal and state cases.232 
Section D sets forth a new vision of the federal equity power: equity fol-
lows the law.233 The body of equitable principles that applies to a claim de-
pends on the law from which the claim arises: federal equitable principles 
govern federal claims, while the equitable principles contained within a 
state’s statutes and judicial rulings govern state claims—including all remedi-
al issues in state-law cases. When federal statutes authorize equitable relief, a 
court may presume that Congress intended to apply traditional principles 
from the English Court of Chancery absent a clear statement in a statute’s text 
or legislative history to the contrary. Likewise, federal courts may apply those 
traditional equitable principles in cases arising under the U.S. Constitution as 
a matter of constitutional common law, unless Congress establishes an alter-
nate remedial scheme. This discussion concludes by examining the implica-
tions of this new approach for one of the most frequently invoked forms of 
equitable relief: injunctions. 
A. Equity and the Federal Rules 
The current version of the Rules of Decision Act provides that “[t]he 
laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply,” unless 
the Constitution, a treaty, or a federal statute “otherwise require[s] or pro-
                                                                                                                                       
 229 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). 
 230 See infra notes 234–294 and accompanying text. 
 231 See infra notes 295–352 and accompanying text. 
 232 See infra notes 353–409 and accompanying text.  
 233 See infra notes 410–441 and accompanying text. 
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vide[s].”234 Unlike earlier versions of the statute,235 the Rules of Decision Act 
now applies to cases in both law and equity.  
 One federal statute that frequently requires courts to ignore “[t]he laws 
of the several states”236 in diversity and supplemental jurisdiction cases is the 
Rules Enabling Act.237 The Rules Enabling Act provides that “[t]he Supreme 
Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and proce-
dure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district 
courts . . . .”238 In 1960, in Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court held that the 
Rules Enabling Act requires a federal court to apply any valid Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in all cases before it, even when the claims arise under 
state law.239 A rule is valid under the Rules Enabling Act so long as it is “ar-
guably procedural.”240 
 Hanna requires a federal court adjudicating a state-law claim to ignore 
state statutes and judicial rulings in favor of a federal rule, however, only 
when there is a “direct collision” between state and federal authorities.241 
Federal courts interpret the Federal Rules narrowly when reasonably possible 
to avoid unnecessarily displacing state laws.242 For example, in 1980, in 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., the Supreme Court held that federal courts 
                                                                                                                                       
 234 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
 235 See supra notes 198, 213 and accompanying text. 
 236 28 U.S.C. § 1652. 
 237 Id. § 2072(a). 
 238 Id. The Supreme Court upheld the Rules Enabling Act as a valid exercise of Congress’ 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, to regulate the 
federal courts. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965); see also Willy v. Coastal 
Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992) (“Congress, acting pursuant to its authority to make all laws 
‘necessary and proper’ to their establishment, also may enact laws regulating the conduct of those 
courts . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 239 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74. 
 240 Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 241 Id. at 472 (majority opinion); accord Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 
(1980). 
 242 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996) (“Federal courts have in-
terpreted the Federal Rules, however, with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory 
policies.”); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37–38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (“[I]n deciding whether a federal procedural statute or Rule of Procedure encompasses a 
particular issue, a broad reading that would create significant disuniformity between state and 
federal courts should be avoided if the text permits.”). Similarly, the Court has opted to interpret 
rules as imposing narrow procedural requirements, rather than broader substantive restrictions, to 
ensure their validity under the Rules Enabling Act. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001) (holding that Rule 41(b) does not require that a federal 
court’s dismissal under a statute of limitations be afforded any res judicata effect, to avoid violat-
ing the plaintiff’s substantive rights); Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 544 n.2 (1984) 
(interpreting Federal Rule 23.1 as imposing a procedural pleading requirement that a complaint in 
a shareholder derivative suit specify whether the plaintiffs made a demand to the corporation’s 
board, rather than a substantive requirement that plaintiffs actually present such a demand, to 
avoid “alter[ing] substantive rights” in violation of the Rules Enabling Act). 
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should apply a state’s rules for tolling its statute of limitations because Rule 3 
of the Federal Rules did not directly address the issue.243 Rule 3 provides that 
“[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”244 State 
law, in contrast, specified that an action was not deemed “‘commenced’ for 
purposes of the statute of limitations until” the summons was served on the 
defendant.245 
The Court held there was no conflict between the federal rule and the 
state statute.246 It explained, “There is no indication that the Rule was intend-
ed to toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace 
state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations.”247 The state 
law, in contrast, reflects “a substantive decision . . . that actual service on, and 
accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an integral part of the several 
policies served by the statute of limitations.”248 The Court concluded that 
“[s]ince there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state 
law,” Hanna and the Rules of Decision Act were inapplicable, and Erie itself 
required federal courts to apply the state statute’s service requirement to pre-
vent plaintiffs from obtaining disparate results in state and federal court.249 
Particularly given the Court’s strong preference for reading the Federal 
Rules consistently with state law, the Federal Rules do not preclude federal 
courts from following state statutes or judicial precedents concerning equita-
ble remedies. This Section will discuss two examples: injunctions under Rule 
65250 and receivers under Rule 66.251 
1. Injunctions Under Rule 65 
Injunctions are the most commonly sought equitable remedy. Rule 65 of 
the Federal Rules sets forth the process for obtaining temporary restraining 
orders (“TROs”) and preliminary injunctions, as well as a few additional rules 
governing all forms of injunctive relief (including permanent injunctions).252 
                                                                                                                                       
 243 446 U.S. at 752–53. 
 244 Id. at 750 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 3). 
 245 Id. at 742 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971)). 
 246 Id. at 751–52. 
 247 Id. at 750–51. 
 248 Id. at 751. 
 249 Id. at 752–53. Likewise, in Palmer v. Hoffman, the Court rejected the argument that Rule 
8(c) places the burden of proof for contributory negligence on the defendant. 318 U.S. 109, 117 
(1943). It explained, “Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of pleading. The question of the burden of 
establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of 
citizenship cases must apply.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 250 See infra notes 252–274 and accompanying text. 
 251 See infra notes 275–294 and accompanying text. 
 252 FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
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The rule does not provide any substantive standards for courts to apply in 
awarding such relief, however.  
Rule 65 specifies that a court may issue an ex parte TRO if the movant 
demonstrates that waiting until the other side is heard would cause “irreparable 
injury, loss or damage.”253 The movant must either identify the efforts it made 
to notify its adversary or explain why notice “should not be required.”254 A 
TRO may last no more than 14 days, although the court may extend that peri-
od for good cause for up to another 14 days (unless the other side consents to 
a longer extension).255 After issuing such an ex parte order, the court must 
schedule a preliminary injunction hearing “at the earliest possible time.”256 
Even before that hearing, a party subject to the order may move to dissolve or 
modify it on two days’ notice to the original movant.257 
Rule 65 provides that a preliminary injunction may be issued only on 
notice to the opposing party.258 The court may consolidate its hearing on a 
preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits.259 It also may require securi-
ty for either a TRO or preliminary injunction to ensure the enjoined party is 
compensated if it turns out the order was issued erroneously.260 
Rule 65 requires that every order—including TROs, preliminary injunc-
tions, and permanent injunctions—specify the reasons it was issued, “state its 
terms specifically,” and “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts re-
strained or required.”261 All TROs and injunctions bind the litigants, their 
agents, and “other persons who are in active concert or participation” with the 
litigants or their agents, so long as they receive “actual notice” of the order 
through any means.262 
Despite these specifications, Rule 65 does not actually identify the cir-
cumstances under which a court should issue a TRO, preliminary injunction, 
or permanent injunction,263 apart from the requirement of “immediate and 
irreparable injury” for TROs.264 The Supreme Court established the modern 
                                                                                                                                       
 253 Id. R. 65(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. R. 65(b)(3). 
 257 Id. R. 65(b)(4). 
 258 Id. R. 65(a)(1). 
 259 Id. R. 65(a)(2). 
 260 Id. R. 65(c). 
 261 Id. R. 65(d)(1)(A)–(C). A TRO must also set forth the date and time it was issued, the 
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 262 Id. R. 65(d)(2)(A)–(C). 
 263 See Crump, supra note 6, at 1272–73 (recognizing that Rule 65 governs only the proce-
dural aspects of injunctive relief). 
 264 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 
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standard for permanent injunctions in its 2006 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange 
L.L.C. decision—a standard the Court  claimed stemmed from traditional eq-
uitable principles rather than Rule 65.265 Under eBay, to obtain a permanent 
injunction, a plaintiff must not only prevail in its underlying cause of action, 
but further demonstrate that: 1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; 2) reme-
dies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to redress 
that injury; 3) a remedy in equity is warranted considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant; and 4) the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.266 
 Lower courts have applied eBay’s four-factor test in a wide range of 
contexts, including intellectual property cases, cases involving other types of 
economic harms, environmental cases, constitutional cases, and cases arising 
under various other statutes.267 The Supreme Court’s subsequent 2008 deci-
sion in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council held that the require-
ments for obtaining a preliminary injunction are similar, except that the plain-
tiff must demonstrate “that he is likely to succeed on the merits.”268 
Several courts, as well as noted treatise authors Wright and Miller,269 
view Rule 65 as the source of the standards governing preliminary injunc-
tions; they contend that the Rule’s drafters intended to implicitly incorporate 
traditional equitable requirements.270 Rule 65, however, does not purport to 
                                                                                                                                       
 265 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 393–94 (2006) (describing the 
four–factor test derived from “well-established principles of equity”); see Mark P. Gergen et al., 
The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 203, 205 (2012) (recognizing eBay as establishing the definitive modern standard for injunc-
tive relief). 
 266 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391, 393–94; accord Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 
139, 156–58 (2010); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). 
 267 Michael T. Morley, Enforcing Equality: Statutory Injunctions, Equitable Balancing Under 
eBay, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 189–90 (collecting cases). 
 268 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Amoco, 480 U.S. at 
546 n.12 (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent 
injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits 
rather than actual success.”). But see Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973) (affirming issu-
ance of preliminary injunction without regard to “the ultimate merits of [the plaintiff’s] conten-
tions”). 
 269 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4513 (“[I]t seems reasonably clear that preliminary 
injunctions or temporary restraining orders may be issued in a diversity case in accordance with 
the terms of Rule 65 regardless of state practice, and further that federal law supplies the standards 
for their issuance.”).   
 270 See, e.g., Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that Rule 65 “incorporates traditional federal equity practice” for preliminary injunctions, 
thereby implicitly establishing the substantive standards federal courts must apply in awarding 
such relief); Office Depot, Inc. v. Impact Office Prods., LLC, No. 1:09 CV 2791, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 117733, at *34 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 2011); KV Pharm Co. v. Medecor Pharma, L.L.C., 
354 F. Supp. 2d 682, 684 (E.D. La. 2003); see also Sys. Operations., Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. 
Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d Cir. 1977); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224, 
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address the standards governing any form of injunctive relief.271 And neither 
eBay nor Winter identifies Rule 65 as the source of those standards. To the 
contrary, the Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he substantive prerequisites 
for obtaining an equitable remedy as well as the general availability of injunc-
tive relief are not altered by [Rule 65] and depend on traditional principles of 
equity jurisdiction.”272 Thus, the circumstances under which a federal court 
may issue an injunction is not “governed by one of the Federal Rules;”273 to 
the contrary, there is “no Federal Rule which cover[s] the point.”274 Neither 
Rule 65, the Rules Enabling Act, nor Hanna v. Plumer requires federal courts 
to apply federal equitable principles when determining the propriety of in-
junctive relief in a state-law case. 
2. Receivers Under Rule 66 
Appointment of a receiver is another equitable remedy a court may grant 
to “preserve and protect” disputed property “pending its final disposition” by 
the court.275 Such appointments are always “ancillary” to the “final relief” the 
court is being asked to award.276 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 66 provides 
that the Federal Rules govern “an action in which the appointment of a re-
ceiver is sought or a receiver sues or is sued.”277 It further states that “the 
practice in administering an estate by a receiver or a similar court-appointed 
                                                                                                                                       
1243–44 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Fed. Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 487 F. Supp. 1248, 
1260–61 (D. Md. 1980), aff’d on other grounds 650 F.2d 495, 499 n.4 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 271 Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that Rule 
65 “does not state that injunctive relief is available in any particular case,” but rather “sets out the 
procedural requirements for injunctions and restraining orders”); see also 13 WM. MOORE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 65.07[2] (“Rule 65 merely sets forth the procedural terms for the issu-
ance of injunctions and restraining orders, and does not itself authorize injunctive relief; that au-
thority derives from the traditional equitable power of federal courts in cases of irreparable inju-
ry.”); Crump, supra note 6, at 1243 (arguing that “[l]ittle support” can be found in Rule 65(a) for 
the proposition that the rule governs the availability of injunctive relief); Shipley, supra note 20, at 
1214–15 (concluding that Rule 65 “is silent on the specific grounds for granting provisional re-
lief,” so “a federal court in a diversity case may be required to apply a state law for granting in-
junctive relief”). 
 272 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–19 
(1999) (quoting 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 2941 (2d ed. 1995)). 
 273 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 37 (1935). 
 276 Id. at 38; see also Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497 (1923) (“[T]he ap-
pointment of a receiver is merely an ancillary and incidental remedy. A receivership is not final 
relief . . . . It is a means of preserving property which may ultimately be applied toward the satis-
faction of substantive rights.”). 
 277 FED. R. CIV. P. 66. The rule also provides that “[a]n action in which a receiver has been 
appointed may be dismissed only by court order.” Id. 
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officer must accord with the historical practice in federal courts or with a lo-
cal rule.”278 
 Although this rule requires receivers to follow “historical practice” in 
administering estates, it does not specify the circumstances under which fed-
eral courts may, must, or cannot appoint a receiver.279 Despite the rule’s si-
lence on the issue, many federal courts have held that the availability of such 
relief, including in cases arising under state law, is governed by traditional 
equitable principles from the English Court of Chancery as construed by the 
federal judiciary.280 Those equitable principles do not provide a “precise for-
mula” for appointing receivers.281 Instead, they require courts to weigh a wide 
range of factors, including “fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendant; 
imminent danger that property would be lost, concealed, injured, diminished 
in value, or squandered;” inadequacy of legal remedies; the balance of hard-
ships; the plaintiff’s likelihood of success in the underlying action; and the 
possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff’s interests in the property.282 
To the extent courts conclude that Rule 66 requires or authorizes them to 
apply uniform federal equitable standards when appointing receivers in state-
law cases,283 they are both overreading the rule and misapplying Hanna. As 
with injunctions, the simple fact that Rule 66 discusses receivers does not 
mean that federal law automatically governs all aspects of them. To the con-
trary, federal law is inapplicable to issues the rule completely fails to address, 
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 279 Id. 
 280 Canada Life Assurance Co. v. LePeter, 563 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal law 
governs the issue of whether to appoint a receiver in a diversity action.”); Nat’l P’ship Inv. Corp. 
v. Nat’l Hous. Dev. Corp., 153 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he appointment of a receiv-
er by a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is governed by federal law.”); Aviation Sup-
ply Corp. v. R.S.B.I. Aerospace, Inc., 999 F.2d 314, 316 (8th Cir. 1993) (“The appointment of a 
receiver in a diversity case is a procedural matter governed by federal law and federal equitable 
principles.”); see also Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turabo Shopping Ctr., Inc., 683 F.2d 25, 26 
(1st Cir. 1982) (discussing litigants’ agreement that “the appointment of receivers in federal court 
is controlled by federal law”). 
 281 Aviation Supply Corp., 999 F.2d at 316; accord Canada Life Assurance Co., 563 F.3d at 
844; see also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Watt W. Invest. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 287, 292 (E.D. Cal. 1991). 
 282 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 683 F.2d at 26–27 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Comvest Trading Corp., 481 F. Supp. 438, 441 (D. Mass. 1979) (footnotes omitted)); 
see also Aviation Supply Corp., 999 F.2d at 316–17; Fimbel v. Fimbel Door Corp., No. 14–1915 
(FLW)(DEA), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46917, at *10–12 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2016) (discussing com-
peting lists of factors). 
 283 Nat’l P’ship Inv. Corp., 153 F.3d at 1291 (“[T]o the extent Rule 66 dictates what princi-
ples should be applied to federal receiverships, courts must comply with the Rule even in the face 
of differing state law.”); accord Canada Life Assurance Co., 563 F.3d at 843; see also Aviation 
Supply Corp., 999 F.2d at 316 (citing Rule 66 for proposition that federal equitable principles 
govern appointment of receivers). 
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such as the circumstances under which they may be appointed.284 Indeed, the 
rule’s only reference to historical practice completely omits any mention of 
receivers’ appointments.285  
The Advisory Committee Note for Rule 66 asserts that the rule “assures 
the application of the [Federal Rules] in all matters except actual administra-
tion of the receivership estate itself.”286 Some courts have construed this 
comment as confirming that traditional equitable principles govern all aspects 
of receivership litigation, including the substantive standards for appointing 
receivers.287 The comment, however, refers only to the portion of Rule 66 
confirming that the rules of civil procedure apply to federal lawsuits “in 
which the appointment of a receiver is sought.”288 As discussed above, that 
language does not impose or incorporate any standards, including traditional 
equitable principles, for appointing receivers. Thus, neither the Federal Rules, 
the Rules Enabling Act, nor Hanna authorizes or requires courts to apply uni-
form federal equitable principles when determining whether to appoint a re-
ceiver in a diversity or supplemental jurisdiction case. 
Numerous state statutes and court rulings provide standards for appoint-
ing receivers that materially differ from the federal factors identified above. 
For example, under Florida law, a litigant must show that an entity engaged in 
fraud or is insolvent to have a receiver appointed.289 A Delaware statute al-
lows a creditor of an insolvent corporation to seek appointment of a receiv-
er,290 while the traditional equitable principles that apply in federal courts al-
low such creditors to seek a receiver only after reducing their claims to judg-
ment and exhausting their legal remedies for collecting the debts.291 Like-
wise, Oklahoma law allows a surety to seek provisional remedies such as ap-
pointment of a receiver even before the underlying debt is due.292 Traditional 
principles of equity, on the other hand, do not allow receivers to be appointed 
                                                                                                                                       
 284 Cf. supra notes 241–249 and accompanying text. 
 285 FED. R. CIV. P. 66; cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (applying expressio unius canon to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
 286 FED. R. CIV. P. 66 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendments. 
 287 See, e.g., Nat’l P’ship Inv. Corp., 153 F.3d at 1291 (contending that the Advisory Commit-
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Tr. Corp. v. Fountain Circle Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 799 F. Supp. 48, 50 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (“The 
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 288 FED. R. CIV. P. 66. 
 289 See Nat’l Pship Inv. Corp., 153 F.3d at 1290–91 (citing McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. 
Schatzberg, 40 So. 2d 201, 202–03 (Fla. 1949)). 
 290 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (2017). 
 291 See Pusey & Jones Co., 261 U.S. at 497. 
 292 See Kelleam v. Md. Cas. Co., 312 U.S. 377, 381–82 (1941). 
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under such circumstances.293 California similarly provides more liberal stand-
ards for receivers’ appointments under certain circumstances, such as where a 
deed of trust expressly provides for it.294 Thus, the choice between federal 
and state law can determine whether the court will appoint a receiver, in turn 
impacting a plaintiff’s ability to ultimately recover from the defendant. 
B. Equity and the Rules of Decision Act 
Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide substantive 
standards governing many equitable remedies, such as injunctions and re-
ceivers, and completely fail to mention others, such as constructive trusts or 
equitable liens, the Rules Enabling Act does not require federal courts to ap-
ply traditional equitable principles when considering them. Nor are there any 
other federal laws addressing the availability of equitable relief in federal 
court, either in general or specifically in cases arising under state law. Thus, 
the Rules of Decision Act, as construed in Erie and its progeny, controls 
whether federal or state law governs equitable remedies in such cases.295 
The Rules of Decision Act provides that, when no federal rule or statute 
addresses an issue, federal courts must treat “[t]he law of the several states” 
as the “rules of decision.”296 Erie interpreted this provision to mean that a 
federal court generally may not devise and apply “substantive rules of com-
mon law” in diversity cases.297 Rather, the Erie Doctrine requires “federal 
courts sitting in diversity [to] apply state substantive law and federal proce-
dural law.”298 
In Guaranty Trust Co v. York, the Supreme Court adopted the “outcome-
determination” test to distinguish between substantive and procedural law.299 
Under Guaranty Trust, an issue was deemed substantive, and therefore gov-
erned by state law, if it could “significantly affect the result of a litigation.”300 
In other words, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state law when-
                                                                                                                                       
 293 Id. at 380. 
 294 See N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 755 F. Supp. at 292. 
 295 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698 (1974) 
(“[W]here there is no relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other Rule promulgated pursuant 
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 299 Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109; see also Hanna, 326 U.S. at 468. 
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ever the choice between state or federal law is likely to affect a case’s out-
come. 
Hanna v. Plumer modified this standard.301 Hanna recognized that ap-
plying virtually any federal requirement, including indisputably procedural 
rules, could affect a case’s outcome.302 The Court therefore held that “choices 
between state and federal law are to be made not by application of any auto-
matic, ‘litmus paper’ criterion,” but rather in light of “the twin aims of the 
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”303 Dean John Hart Ely emphasized that, under 
the Rules of Decision Act, “[t]he test is whether the choice between the [fed-
eral and state standards] is material in the sense Hanna indicated.”304 
Under the Erie Doctrine, state law—not traditional principles applied by 
the English Court of Chancery—should govern equitable remedial issues in 
federal diversity cases, for two reasons. First, Hanna’s modified outcome-
determination test dictates that state law should govern equitable remedies 
because applying state law furthers the Erie Doctrine’s objectives. Second, 
more broadly, remedies are properly considered substantive rather than pro-
cedural. Courts have recognized other types of remedies as substantive, and 
there is no reason equitable remedies should be treated categorically differ-
ently. Moreover, developments in the intriguingly analogous context of crim-
inal law confirm that remedies should not be distinguished from the law gov-
erning an underlying cause of action. 
1. Equity, Hanna, and the Twin Aims of Erie 
Most basically, equitable remedies qualify as substantive under Hanna’s 
modified outcome-determination test.305 As noted above, Hanna provides that 
an issue is substantive, and therefore governed by state law in diversity cases, 
when applying a distinct body of federal standards would lead to forum shop-
ping and “inequitable administration of the laws.”306 
 Guaranty Trust itself recognizes that the equitable remedial rights doc-
trine sometimes leads to substantial disparities in the relief a court may award 
                                                                                                                                       
 301 380 U.S. at 468; see also Ely, supra note 295, at 717–18 (explaining that Hanna provided 
“a rejuvenated outcome determination test”). 
 302 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 303 Id. at 467–68. 
 304 Ely, supra note 295, at 723. 
 305 See Wolf, supra note 20, at 50 (arguing that federal courts should apply state-law stand-
ards for injunctions to discourage forum shopping and “prevent the inequitable administration of 
the law”); see also 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 4513 (“[A]n independent federal law of 
remedies would be contrary to the twin aims of Erie as described in the Hanna decision, as well as 
Justice Brandeis’ constitutional analysis in Erie.”). 
 306 380 U.S. at 467–68. 
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based solely on choice of forum.307 The ability to obtain certain types of relief 
can have a tremendous impact on a plaintiff’s willingness to litigate in a par-
ticular forum. Even disparities in the ability to obtain interim relief, such as a 
preliminary injunction or receivership, can lead plaintiffs to suffer irreparable 
injury that would dramatically affect their choice of forum.308 Equitable relief 
tends to be specific rather than substitutionary, allowing plaintiffs to enforce 
their actual rights, rather than having to accept their monetary equivalent as 
compensation for violations.309 Such relief is also frequently ex ante, allow-
ing plaintiffs to prevent violations of their rights before they occur or stop 
ongoing violations, rather than being relegated to seeking ex post compensa-
tion.310 Thus, differences between state and federal standards for obtaining 
interim or permanent equitable relief are likely to weigh heavily in a plain-
tiff’s choice of forum.311  
Professor David E. Shipley disagrees, pointing out that plaintiffs typically 
consider a wide range of factors when selecting a court, including “differences 
in jury selection practices, differences in discovery, differences in docket man-
agement, and perceptions about appointed judges instead of elected judges.”312 
Although such considerations might weigh more heavily than choice-of-law 
issues concerning equitable relief in some cases, the underlying point remains: 
when a plaintiff needs equitable relief, particularly immediate relief, differ-
ences in legal standards can substantially affect its choice of forum. 
Likewise, basing the availability of either interim or permanent relief 
solely on whether litigants are “in a federal court instead of a State court a 
block away”313 also leads to “inequitable administration of the laws.”314 Par-
ticularly because the type of relief (legal versus equitable) a court is likely to 
award is often very important to litigants, their equitable rights should not 
                                                                                                                                       
 307 326 U.S. at 106 (rejecting the premise that “whatever equitable remedy is available in a 
State court must be available in a diversity suit” and emphasizing that “a federal court may afford 
an equitable remedy for a substantive right recognized by a State even though a State court cannot 
give it” (citations omitted)). 
 308 See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (holding that, under federal standards, “[a] plaintiff seeking a 
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 312 Shipley, supra note 20, at 1217–18. 
 313 Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109. 
 314 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
2018] The Federal Equity Power 261 
hinge on “the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship between [them]. 
The policies underlying diversity jurisdiction do not support such a distinc-
tion between state and federal [litigants].”315  
Guaranty Trust does not provide any good reason to allow federal courts 
to maintain an independent body of law to govern equitable relief in both fed-
eral and state cases.316 The Court declared that “[e]quitable relief in a federal 
court . . . must be within the traditional scope of equity as historically evolved 
in the English Court of Chancery”317 without explaining why those principles 
apply in state-law cases. Despite Erie’s repudiation of general law, this hold-
ing treats equity as a comparable “transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular State” that binds federal courts in matters arising under state law.318  
The Guaranty Trust Court further explained that, under section 16 of the 
Judiciary Act, a federal court may not award equitable relief unless “a plain, 
adequate and complete remedy at law [is] wanting.”319 Due to the merger of 
law and equity, however, section 16 was omitted as obsolete from the modern 
Judiciary Code when it was recodified three years after Guaranty Trust was 
decided.320 Because section 16 was repealed, it no longer directly binds fed-
eral courts.  
One might respond by pointing out that section 16 “was but declaratory 
of the rule in equity, established long before its adoption.”321 As discussed 
above, however, the traditional rules of the English Court of Chancery cannot 
apply of their own force in a post-Erie world. Of course, most states have 
incorporated this “inadequate remedy at law” principle into their own equity 
jurisprudence, so federal courts still must typically apply it in diversity cases 
                                                                                                                                       
 315 Walker, 446 U.S. at 753; cf. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431 (“Erie precludes a recovery in 
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 316 See The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, supra note 12, at 417 (“The policy behind 
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262 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1 
as a matter of state law.322 And even if the Court were to somehow interpret 
Title 28 of the United States Code as a whole as implicitly retaining this “in-
adequate remedy at law” principle, it would be simply one federal side con-
straint that could be applied against the backdrop of state statutes and court 
rulings concerning equitable remedies. 
Guaranty Trust also noted that “explicit Congressional curtailment of 
equity powers must be respected,” but such limitations are few and far be-
tween.323 No federal statutes purport to either establish a code of federal equi-
table remedies or prohibit federal courts from applying state law when grant-
ing equitable relief.324 Guaranty Trust’s discussion concluded by reaffirming 
that “the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be evaded.”325 Because 
juries typically play no role in equity, this restriction is unlikely to be signifi-
cant. Even in cases where a state has authorized equitable relief under cir-
cumstances that would implicate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury in 
federal court, however, a federal court could apply state standards while al-
lowing a jury to make any constitutionally required findings or judgments. 
Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice treatise largely agrees with this 
analysis as applied to permanent injunctions although, even in that context, it 
contends that federal courts should reserve the power to ignore state equitable 
principles “in exceptional cases in order to effect justice expeditiously or cre-
atively.”326 Of course, speed and judicial creativity play no role in Hanna’s 
explanation of the Erie Doctrine. More significantly, the treatise contends that 
federal courts sitting in diversity may apply uniform federal standards to in-
terim relief such as preliminary injunctions because they are not final judg-
ments for purposes of any outcome-determination test, but rather “procedures 
for preserving the status quo pending a fair and complete adjudication of the 
merits.”327  
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merits should not be substantially affected by going with the federal standard instead of a state’s 
standard for provisional relief. A court’s ruling on a preliminary or interlocutory injunction is not 
final.”). Wright and Miller also contend that Hanna requires courts to apply federal standards to 
preliminary injunctions because Rule 65 discusses them. 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, 
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This argument is unpersuasive in several respects. Most basically, 
Wright and Miller’s analysis rests solely on Guaranty Trust’s outcome deter-
mination test, ignoring the two-prong standard Hanna adopted in its place.328 
As this subsection has demonstrated, the “twin aims of Erie”329 are best 
served by compelling a federal court to apply the same body of equitable re-
medial principles in diversity cases as a state court would, for both interim 
and final relief. Moreover, it seems strange that a federal court would apply 
different bodies of law at different stages of a case to determine a plaintiff’s 
entitlement to an equitable remedy: federal law for interim relief, state law for 
permanent relief. Such inconsistency could prevent a federal court from en-
joining irreparable injury that a plaintiff would ultimately be entitled to avoid. 
Even considered on its own terms, however, Wright and Miller’s argu-
ment is unconvincingly formalistic. An interim remedy changes at least one 
of the litigants’ substantive rights—its power to perform certain primary ac-
tions in the ordinary world outside of court—even if only temporarily. Such 
an alteration in a party’s rights can properly be regarded as part of a case’s 
outcome, regardless of its duration.  
Furthermore, interim relief affects the outcome of the case by helping 
preserve the possibility of a meaningful judgment on the merits. A prelimi-
nary injunction can prevent irreparable harm that would otherwise moot a 
case, precluding a judicial determination of the parties’ rights. Similarly, a 
receiver can help preserve a defendant’s assets ensuring that they remain 
available to satisfy a judgment. The outcome of a case thus can often depend 
on the availability of interim remedies. State law should therefore govern in-
terim equitable relief as well as permanent relief.  
Thus, Guaranty Trust retained the equitable remedial rights doctrine too 
reflexively without fully considering Erie’s implications for it.330 The ruling 
does not provide a valid basis for allowing federal courts to ignore state stat-
utes and precedents when granting equitable relief in state-law cases. Under 
Hanna’s modified outcome-determination test, federal and state courts should 
apply the state-law standards for awarding equitable relief in diversity cases 
to prevent forum shopping and avoid inequitable administration of the laws. 
                                                                                                                                       
§ 4513. The previous Section discussed the errors in that argument. See supra notes 269–274 and 
accompanying text.  
 328 Wright and Miller suggest that Guaranty Trust rather than Hanna is the proper standard 
because Hanna did not “involve[] a question of remedies.” 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, 
§ 4513. Hanna appears fully applicable to remedial issues, however. See infra notes 342–347 and 
accompanying text. 
 329 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–68. 
 330 John C. McCoid, II, Hanna v. Plumer, The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 
884, 907 n.110 (1965) (arguing that Guaranty Trust “assumed . . . too easily, that variation in 
remedy does not impinge on substantive law”). 
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The same reasoning mandating the extension of Erie to equity in general331 
applies with equal force to equitable remedies. 
2. Remedies as Substantive Law 
More broadly, remedies should be deemed categorically substantive, not 
procedural, for Erie purposes. Some scholars contend that remedies exist in 
the hazy hinterlands between the much more familiar realms of “substantive” 
and “procedural” rights.332 Whatever the merits of such arguments, remedies 
should be deemed substantive under the Erie Doctrine. 
 Daryl Levinson cogently explains that rights are “inseparable from[] 
remedies.”333 His theory of “remedial substantiation” teaches that “we should 
look at rights and remedies as part of a single package,” because “the practi-
cal value of a right is determined by its associated remedies.”334 The substan-
tive policies underlying rights created by state law can be frustrated by either 
ineffective or overly strict remedies, as well as unduly restrictive or liberal 
standards governing their availability. 
Calabresi and Melamed’s seminal “cathedral” framework confirms the 
integral relationship between rights and remedies.335 They explain that, for 
each legal right or entitlement, a state must decide not only which competing 
claimant should receive it, but also the manner in which it should be protect-
ed.336 A right or entitlement may be protected by either a liability rule, mean-
ing ex post compensatory damages, or a property rule, such as an ex ante in-
junction.337 The choice of liability rule or property rule protection for an enti-
                                                                                                                                       
       331 Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 105, 108–09; Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 
(1938). 
 332 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 333 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 884 (1999). 
 334 Id. at 888, 904. 
 335 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1110 (1972). 
 336 Id. at 1092 (“The state not only has to decide whom to entitle, but it must also simultane-
ously make a series of equally difficult . . . decisions. . . . [concerning] the manner in which enti-
tlements are protected . . . .”). 
 337 In the cathedral framework: 
 A third party may violate an entitlement protected by a liability rule, without the 
entitlement holder’s consent, so long as it pays the entitlement’s fair market value 
(i.e., compensatory damages). The entitlement holder may not prevent third parties 
from violating the entitlement, but rather may insist only on receiving an objectively 
determined amount of compensation. 
 A property rule, in contrast, gives an entitlement holder the formal legal right to 
prevent third parties from violating his entitlement ex ante. An entitlement protected 
by a property rule cannot be transferred to a third party without the entitlement 
holder’s consent. 
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tlement “is often made because it facilitates a combination of efficiency and 
distributive results.”338 
If a federal court grants property rule protection (by issuing an injunc-
tion) for an entitlement that a state chose to protect solely by liability rules, it 
may frustrate socially beneficial transactions. An entitlement protected by a 
property rule may be transferred only with the voluntary consent of the right-
holder, but high transaction costs may frustrate or preclude such agreements, 
even when they would lead to Pareto superior outcomes.339 Likewise, if a 
state allows property rule protection for an entitlement, but a federal court 
instead relegates a right-holder to liability rule protection (by refusing to issue 
an injunction), right-holders may be deprived of the specific entitlements the 
state sought to guarantee them and forced to accept cash equivalents in-
stead.340 A court’s choice of remedies thus directly implicates substantive pol-
icy considerations to the same extent as the underlying cause of action.341 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that remedies are sub-
stantive in the Erie context.342 For example, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. 
Kelco Disposal, the Court held, “In a diversity action, . . . the propriety of an 
award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors the 
jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law.”343 
Likewise, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., the Court held that a 
state law requiring stricter appellate review of damages awards than federal 
law permitted was substantive and therefore applicable in diversity cases.344 
The Gasperini Court explained, “Erie precludes a recovery in federal court 
                                                                                                                                       
Morley, supra note 310, at 2488 (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 335, at 1092). I have 
argued elsewhere that the traditional cathedral framework is incomplete, particularly for public 
law cases. It should further distinguish between “potential property rules,” which protect entitle-
ments for which the right-holder has a substantial likelihood of being able to obtain injunctive 
relief, and “complete property rules,” which protect entitlements that are currently protected by an 
injunction. Id. at 2491–92. 
 338 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 335, at 1110. 
 339 Id. at 1119. A “Pareto superior” transaction is one which “makes at least one person in the 
world better off and no one worse off.” P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 966 (13th 
ed. 1989). 
 340 See Morley, supra note 310, at 2480. 
 341 See Crump, supra note 6, at 1272 (arguing that state policies governing equitable relief “are 
just as important as those defining underlying rights” and deserve to be “properly vindicated”). 
 342 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407–08 (2010) 
(recognizing that a rule is substantive for Erie purposes if it “alter[s] the rights themselves, the 
available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the court adjudicate[s] either” (emphasis 
added)). 
 343 492 U.S. 257, 278 (1989). 
 344 518 U.S. at 430–31. 
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significantly larger than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state 
court.”345  
Outside the damages context, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Ameri-
ca, the Court held that “the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or 
shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action created by the 
State.”346 The arbitrability of a case to which the Federal Arbitrration Act did 
not apply therefore was a substantive issue governed by state law, rather than 
federal common law.347 As remedial issues are generally considered to be 
substantive and governed by state law, there is no basis for treating equitable 
remedies differently. 
The equivalence of the elements of a cause of action and the standards 
governing remedies is confirmed in the surprisingly analogous context of 
criminal law. In 2000, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that 
a prosecutor must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that 
could lead to an increase in the maximum sentence a defendant may re-
ceive.348 The State of New Jersey had argued that, although the Constitution 
required the prosecution to prove elements of a criminal offense to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, sentencing factors that merely increased a de-
fendant’s sentence could be proved to the trial judge by a preponderance of 
the evidence.349 In effect, the state tried to argue that a constitutionally rele-
vant distinction existed between the elements of a crime and the facts neces-
sary to impose sentencing enhancements. 
The Apprendi Court flatly refused to distinguish between “an ‘element’ 
of a felony offense and a ‘sentencing factor.’”350 Sentencing factors, like the 
elements of an offense, are simply “circumstances of [a] crime” that lead to a 
particular punishment.351 The Court emphasized that “the relevant inquiry is 
one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defend-
ant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty ver-
dict?”352 The elements of a crime are analogous to the elements of a civil 
cause of action, and sentencing factors are comparable to the elements that 
must be proven to obtain a particular civil remedy, whether legal or equitable. 
                                                                                                                                       
 345 Id. at 431; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 
n.31 (1975) (holding that a litigant’s entitlement to recover attorneys’ fees is substantive). 
 346 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (emphasis added). 
 347 Id. 
 348 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increas-
es the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 349 Id. at 469. 
 350 Id. at 478. 
 351 Id. at 480. 
 352 Id. at 494. 
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Apprendi recognized that elements of an offense and sentencing factors are 
functionally interchangeable—both must be proven for a defendant to receive 
a particular sentence. So, too, the elements of a civil cause of action and the 
requirements for obtaining a particular remedy are likewise interchangeable. 
Both are simply facts a plaintiff must prove to be eligible to receive a particu-
lar form of relief. Apprendi thus confirms the substantive nature of remedies. 
In short, the Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts to apply state 
law when determining the availability of relief, including equitable relief, in 
cases arising under state law. The equitable remedial rights doctrine cannot 
survive Erie; Guaranty Trust is an anachronism without a statutory basis. 
C. Equity and the Constitution 
The Rules of Decision Act, properly interpreted, requires federal courts 
to apply a state’s statutes and precedents concerning all equitable issues, in-
cluding remedial issues, in diversity and supplemental jurisdiction cases.353 
Because Guaranty Trust is a long-established precedent, the Supreme Court 
may be reluctant to overturn it based solely on doubts about its reasoning.354 
Like the Supreme Court’s Swift v. Tyson decision in 1842,355 however, Guar-
anty Trust’s misinterpretation of the Rules of Decision Act raises constitu-
tional problems, as well. Subsection 1 below explains how the equitable re-
medial rights doctrine violates principles of federalism.356 Subsection 2 con-
siders the separation-of-powers problems it creates.357 Subsection 3 concludes 
by distinguishing equity from other bodies of federal common law that feder-
al courts have constitutional authority to develop.358  
1. Federalism 
The equitable remedial rights doctrine violates federalism-based re-
strictions on federal courts. The Constitution allows Congress to exercise only 
limited, enumerated powers, protecting the states’ prerogative to exclusively 
govern other remaining fields, which the Framers did not deem to be of na-
tional concern.359 Congress may not enact, or authorize federal courts to craft, 
either federal law, or general law governing only diversity cases, concerning 
                                                                                                                                       
 353 Supra notes 295–352 and accompanying text. 
 354 Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 (“If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we 
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century.”). 
 355 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 356 See infra notes 359–376 and accompanying text.  
 357 See infra notes 377–398 and accompanying text.  
 358 See infra notes 399–409 and accompanying text. 
 359 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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areas outside the scope of its enumerated powers.360 For the same federalism-
related reasons, federal courts may not claim power (as they did in Swift) to 
develop substantive rules of decision concerning matters outside the scope of 
Congress’ legislative authority.361 The establishment and application of gen-
eral law in diversity cases “invaded rights . . . reserved by the Constitution to 
the several states.”362  
These federalism-related limits preclude both Congress and the federal 
judiciary from establishing a uniform body of federal equitable principles 
governing remedies in diversity cases. Several provisions in Article I of the 
Constitution empower Congress to dictate remedies specifically for certain 
types of cases, such as disputes affecting interstate commerce363 or patents.364 
Congress lacks broader authority, however, to establish a general law of equi-
table remedies that federal courts must apply in all equity cases.365 Under 
Erie, it would therefore violate federalism-based limits on the national gov-
ernment’s authority for a federal court to do so, either.366 
                                                                                                                                       
 360 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“[Congress] has no power to declare substantive rules of common 
law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general’ . . . .”). Dean Ely, adopt-
ing this federalism-based interpretation of Erie, explained that Swift v. Tyson’s recognition of 
federal courts’ power to craft general law was “unconstitutional because nothing in the Constitu-
tion provide[s] the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort the Court 
had been exercising . . . .” Ely, supra note 295, at 703. 
 361 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 395 (1964) (“[I]t would be even more unreasonable to suppose that the feder-
al courts have a law-making power which the federal legislature does not. . . . The spectacle of 
federal judges being able to make law without possibility of Congressional correction would not 
be a happy one.”). 
 362 Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. Scholars have pointed out that, in light of sweepingly broad modern 
interpretations of Congress’ powers, these federalism-based restrictions are fairly minimal. See 
Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 612 (2008) (“The problem with 
Erie’s enumerated-powers argument is that any ‘gap’ between Article III diversity jurisdiction and 
Article I legislative power is too small to explain Erie, much less justify the wholesale reversal of 
Swift-era common law.”). 
 363 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); see, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012). 
 364 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Patent Clause); see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–284 (2012). 
 365 Cross, supra note 20, at 201 (“None of Congress’s enumerated powers . . . are broad 
enough to cover the entire set of substantive rules that comprise the law of equity. Congress cer-
tainly has no power to regulate what remedies are available in cases arising under state law, even 
when those remedies are [sic] heard in federal court.”). Congress likely could strip federal courts 
of their jurisdiction to grant particular remedies, however, including in diversity cases. Cf. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress power to “constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is subject 
to “such exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make”). 
 366 Cf. Plank, supra note 20, at 670 (“[F]ederal courts in bankruptcy may not use their equity 
power to go beyond Congress’s power under the Constitution. To the extent that equity plays a 
role in bankruptcy, that role must be confined to the limits of bankruptcy law.”). 
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Some scholars reject this federalism-based interpretation of Erie, argu-
ing that the Constitution’s Diversity Jurisdiction Clause,367 read in conjunc-
tion with the Necessary and Proper Clause,368 permits Congress to either craft 
substantive rules of decision for diversity cases or authorize federal courts to 
do so.369 Such arguments are unpersuasive. Although Congress’ power to es-
tablish courts implicitly carries with it the prerogative to enact or authorize 
the creation of procedural rules to govern them,370 it cannot reasonably be 
read as allowing Congress to establish rules of decision—substantive law—
for those courts to apply.371 If the power to create courts implicitly carried 
with it the power to enact substantive law for them to apply, then Article I’s 
grants of lawmaking power over certain specified substantive areas would be 
largely unnecessary. Moreover, the notions of limited government and enu-
merated powers upon which Article I is based372 would be undermined, at 
least within federal courts.373  
                                                                                                                                       
 367 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 7 (“The judicial power shall extend . . . to controver-
sies . . . between citizens of different states.”).  
 368 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“Congress shall have power . . . [t]o make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all other powers vested by this Constitution in 
the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”). 
 369 Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision—More on the Erie Case, 30 KY. L.J. 
3 (1941) (arguing that Article III’s jurisdictional grants permit federal courts to engage in substan-
tive lawmaking); McCormick & Hewes, supra note 113, at 135 (“[T]he Judiciary article and the 
‘necessary and proper’ clause could well be interpreted to confer” upon Congress power to “lay 
down rules of substantive law for controversies between citizens of different states.” (parentheses 
omitted)); see also Note, Congress, the Tompkins Case, and the Conflict of Laws, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 1002, 1003–04 (1939) (“[T]he Judiciary Article and the ‘necessary and proper’ clause of 
Article One may fully authorize Congressional legislation prescribing the substantive law to be 
applied in the federal courts.”). 
 370 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 (“[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules 
governing the practice and pleading in those courts . . . .”). 
 371 Id. at 471–72 (“[N]either Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulat-
ing rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal 
authority contained in Article I or some other section of the Constitution.”); Ely, supra note 295, 
at 703–04 (“The Constitution’s reference to a diversity of citizenship jurisdiction had been intend-
ed as that and no more—a grant of power to provide courts for diversity cases and to prescribe the 
rules of practice and procedure by which they would manage their business, but not to go on and 
provide them . . . with rules that could not fairly be characterized as procedural.”); see also Plank, 
supra note 20, at 637 (“If Congress does not have the power under Article I of the Constitution to 
prescribe a rule to be applied in a particular controversy, then federal judges . . . must apply state 
law.”); cf. infra notes 387–393 and accompanying text (arguing that broad jurisdictional grants to 
courts do not inherently confer authority to craft substantive rules of decision). 
 372 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (specifying that Congress may exercise only the legislative 
powers “herein granted”); see also supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
 373 Cross, supra note 20, at 205; Friendly, supra note 361, at 396 (“[I]t would subvert the 
scheme of the Constitution . . . to read this auxiliary clause as a catch-all empowering Congress to 
enact a code of private law applicable to all relations between citizens, subject to the sole qualifi-
cation” that one party can invoke federal jurisdiction.). 
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Judge Henry Friendly opined in his seminal article on Erie that “so im-
portant an assignment of legislative power could not fairly be hung on so in-
conspicuous a peg.”374 He added that “[e]stablishing a body of substantive 
law for federal courts in matters not otherwise of federal concern is not a le-
gitimate end within the scope of the Constitution”375 for purposes of McCul-
loch v. Maryland.376 Thus, under a federalism-based interpretation of Erie, 
because Congress lacks power to impose substantive standards governing 
equitable relief in diversity cases, federal courts may not do so, either.  
2. Separation of Powers 
Even if establishing a generally applicable body of equitable remedial 
principles for federal courts were within the federal government’s power, it 
would violate separation-of-powers restrictions for federal courts to assume 
such authority for themselves without statutory authorization. Under a separa-
tion-of-powers interpretation of Erie, federal courts may not establish general 
law or federal common law—including equitable remedial principles to apply 
in diversity cases—without some constitutional or statutory delegation of au-
thority to do so.377  
 Congress has not enacted any laws granting federal courts general au-
thority to establish equitable principles applicable to all cases (including di-
versity cases) that come before them.378 When a particular federal statute al-
lows courts to enjoin violations of its substantive provisions, a court may pre-
sume that Congress implicitly intended to incorporate traditional equitable 
standards.379 But no comparable basis exists for applying such federal equita-
ble standards in diversity cases that arise under state law. Federal courts sit-
                                                                                                                                       
 374 Friendly, supra note 361, at 394. 
 375 Id. at 397. 
 376 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). McCulloch famously interpreted 
the Necessary and Proper Clause by declaring, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional.” Id. at 421. 
 377 Clark, supra note 196, at 1290, 1302 (arguing that federal courts may not ignore state law 
unless authorized to do so by a source of law listed in the Supremacy Clause); Paul J. Mishkin, 
Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (1974) (“[That] 
Congress may have constitutional power to make federal law displacing state substantive policy 
does not imply an equal range of power for federal judges. Principles related to the separation of 
powers impose an additional limit on the authority of federal courts to engage in lawmaking on 
their own.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Plank, supra note 20, at 649; Congress, the Tompkins 
Case, and the Conflict of Laws, supra note 369, at 1004. 
 378 Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (holding that the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 authorizes federal courts to create a body of federal common 
law to govern collective bargaining agreements). 
 379 See infra notes 432–436 and accompanying text. 
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ting in diversity should therefore apply the equitable principles, including 
equitable remedial principles, of the state whose law gave rise to the dis-
pute.380 
Some critics maintain that Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdiction 
empowers federal courts to craft substantive rules of decision to govern di-
versity cases.381 They point out that other jurisdictional grants, such as those 
concerning admiralty382 and controversies between states,383 allow federal 
courts to develop substantive law to apply in such cases.384 Those other juris-
dictional provisions, however, are fundamentally different from constitution-
al385 and statutory386 grants of diversity jurisdiction in a variety of respects.  
The Constitution empowers Congress to enact statutes governing admi-
ralty and most interstate disputes that are equally binding on federal and state 
courts, so no federalism concerns arise from federal courts crafting such rules 
as a matter of federal common law. Congress lacks comparable authority to 
adopt a body of rules for resolving disputes between citizens of different 
states,387 so federalism considerations counsel against allowing federal courts 
to do so.388 Moreover, admiralty cases and disputes between states involve 
narrow, specialized areas of the law that affect relatively few litigants.389 A 
court’s diversity jurisdiction, in contrast, “cover[s] almost the whole range of 
                                                                                                                                       
 380 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (holding that a federal court 
should not craft federal common law for an area simply because “Congress could under the Con-
stitution readily enact a complete code of law governing [it]”). 
 381 See, e.g., McCormick & Hewins, supra note 113, at 135. 
 382 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 383 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 5. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, has similarly been 
construed as not only a jurisdictional grant, but a limited delegation of authority to determine the 
substantive content of the law of nations (in arguable violation of Congress’ responsibility under 
the Offenses Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10). See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692 (2004); Michael T. Morley, Note, The Law of Nations and the Offenses Clause of the 
Constitution: A Defense of Federalism, 112 YALE L.J. 109 (2003) (discussing the original concep-
tion of the phrase “law of nations”). 
 384 See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“Article III of the Constitution 
vested in the federal courts jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases, and, since that time, 
the Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of 
admiralty law.”); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 
(1938) (“[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States 
is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either 
State can be conclusive.”). 
 385 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 7. 
 386 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012). 
 387 See supra notes 359–376 and accompanying text. 
 388 Cross, supra note 20, at 205; Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme 
Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 189, 201 (1957); McCormick & 
Hewins, supra note 113, at 142. 
 389 Cross, supra note 20, at 205. 
272 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1 
ordinary legal disputes.”390 The power to make substantive rules of decision 
for diversity cases would constitute virtually plenary power to regulate nearly 
all aspects of life, including torts, contracts, property, and other foundational 
fields of law. Neither the history nor structure of the Constitution suggests 
federal courts possess such authority, especially in equity, which many Fram-
ers particularly distrusted.391  
Finally, the Supreme Court has become much more precise about distin-
guishing jurisdiction from other types of issues than it was in decades past.392 
This new line of authority provides further reason for distinguishing a juris-
dictional grant from the power to create substantive rules of decision.393 Thus, 
the fact that certain provisions in Article III, such as the Admiralty Clause, are 
interpreted as authorizing federal courts to craft rules of decision does not 
suggest the Diversity Jurisdiction Clause should be construed the same way. 
Federal courts sitting in diversity should defer to state law for any remedial or 
equitable matters for which Congress has not provided statutory standards. 
Professor John T. Cross contends that federal courts may develop and 
apply independent federal equitable principles in diversity cases on somewhat 
different grounds. Although he recognizes that the Diversity Jurisdiction 
Clause does not itself authorize federal courts to craft such principles,394 Pro-
fessor Cross nevertheless contends that they have inherent power to do so. He 
argues that Article III requires federal courts to adjudicate rights in “roughly 
the same” way as English courts traditionally did, and the English Court of 
Chancery possessed “the ability to exercise discretion in determining whether 
and how to enforce a legal right.”395 Erie, he maintains, does not limit this 
“traditional power to exercise discretion in matters involving whether and 
how a substantive right should be enforced.”396 Federal courts should there-
                                                                                                                                       
 390 McCormick & Hewins, supra note 113, at 142. 
 391 See supra notes 89, 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 392 See, e.g., Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 610 (2010) (distinguishing jurisdictional 
issues from “claims processing rules”); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–55 (2004) (reiterat-
ing that courts and litigants should not use the term “jurisdictional” for “claim-processing rules, 
but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the 
persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority”); Steel Co. v. Citi-
zens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (distinguishing merits-related issues from jurisdic-
tional issues).  
 393 See also Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 250 (2008) 
(“Erie . . . rejected the idea that the mere existence of jurisdiction carries with it the power to dic-
tate substantive legal standards.”). 
 394 Cross, supra note 20, at 201, 205. 
 395 Id. at 207, 209. 
 396 Id. at 213. 
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fore apply “uniform national rules that originated in England,” rather than 
state law, when granting equitable relief.397  
Cross offers the most thorough modern defense of the equitable remedi-
al rights doctrine. Although consistent with Guaranty Trust, his argument 
does not support such an exception to the modern Erie framework. The Con-
stitution grants federal courts power to adjudicate various types of disputes, 
including diversity cases, in both law and equity.398 Modern courts and com-
mentators generally agree that Article III’s grant of jurisdiction over common-
law disputes neither permits federal courts to apply their own conception of 
common-law principles (i.e., general law) in diversity cases, nor requires 
them to adhere to the English common-law courts’ conception of the common 
law as it existed back in 1789.  
The same is true of equity. The fact that the Constitution allows federal 
courts to adjudicate cases in equity neither inherently ties them to a particular 
body of equitable principles from over two centuries ago, nor requires them 
to ignore state equity laws and precedents in cases arising under state law. As 
discussed in the next Section, equity is not a single, uniform, freestanding 
body of principles that federal courts are required to apply to all cases that 
come before them. Rather, through statutes and judicial opinions, each state 
has developed its own, somewhat different body of equitable principles, often 
reflecting substantive policy determinations. Under Erie and Hanna, federal 
courts lack inherent power to set aside those policies in diversity cases. Thus, 
because Congress has neither displaced states’ respective equity systems nor 
authorized federal courts to do so—either in general or specifically with re-
gard to remedies—separation-of-powers concerns counsel strongly against 
federal courts claiming such authority for themselves. 
3. Equity and Federal Common Law 
A final important consideration is that equity differs materially from the 
bodies of federal common law that the Erie Doctrine allows federal courts to 
create. Erie’s blanket declaration that “[t]here is no federal general common 
law” is admittedly overbroad.399 Even after Erie, the Supreme Court has held 
that federal courts may craft federal common law to cover “cases raising is-
sues of uniquely federal concern.”400 The Court has approved the adoption of 
                                                                                                                                       
 397 Id. at 214. 
 398 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 399 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 400 Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981); see also Wallis, 384 
U.S. at 66–67, 72 (holding that state law, rather than federal common law, governed a dispute 
among private parties concerning an oil and gas lease of federal land because, “[i]n deciding 
whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that a 
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federal common law for cases concerning “the rights and obligations of the 
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting 
rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.”401 
In state-law cases, neither equity in general, nor equitable remedial rights in 
particular, comes close to meeting this standard.402 
Cases arising under state law that do not involve the federal government 
or federal officials as parties do not categorically implicate important federal 
interests.403 The federal government is generally unaffected by whether state-
created rights are protected by liability rules or property rules. Particularly 
because the law of each state differs, the government likewise lacks a strong 
interest in applying a uniform body of principles to govern remedies, includ-
ing equitable remedies, in cases arising under state law throughout the nation. 
Unlike many other fields governed by federal common law, such as federal 
negotiable instruments,404 federal contracts,405 federal loan programs,406 and 
liability for harming members of the Armed Forces,407 the availability of eq-
uitable remedies in diversity and supplemental jurisdiction cases does not 
affect the government’s powers, rights, or liabilities. And unlike the federal 
common law governing disputes between states408 or certain transnational 
disputes,409 equity is not an area of peculiar national concern that is constitu-
tionally committed to the national government. 
Thus, there is no need for national uniformity and no federal interest to 
vindicate with respect to equitable remedies in cases arising under state law. 
                                                                                                                                       
significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises 
must first be specifically shown”). 
 401 Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
 402 But see von Moschzisker, supra note 17, at 289 (pre-Erie article supporting federal courts’ 
aggressive implementation of federal equitable principles to protect perceived federal interests). 
 403 See Miree v. DeKalb Cty., 433 U.S. 25, 31 (1977) (holding that a court should not apply 
federal common law “since the litigation is among private parties and no substantial rights or 
duties of the United States hinge on its outcome”). 
 404 Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see also Bank of Am. 
Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34 (1956) (“Federal law of course governs the 
interpretation of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the Government bonds them-
selves.”). 
 405 Miree, 433 U.S. at 31 (stating that federal common law applies “in interpreting the rights 
and duties of the United States under federal contracts”). 
 406 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1979). 
 407 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1947) (holding that the Govern-
ment’s ability to seek indemnification from tortfeasors who harm members of the military is “ap-
propriate for uniform national treatment rather than diversified local disposition” and thus “more 
fittingly determinable by independent federal judicial decision than by reference to varying state 
policies”). 
 408 See, e.g., Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110. 
 409 See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
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Equitable remedies in ordinary tort, property, and contract cases do not be-
come appropriate subjects of federal common law simply because disputes 
arise between citizens of different states. 
D. A New Conception of Equity: Equity Follows the Law 
Federal courts should fundamentally reconceptualize their approach to 
the federal equity power. They should abandon their traditional understanding 
of equity as a freestanding body of principles derived from the English Court 
of Chancery that governs remedies either of its own force, or as a result of 
some grant of jurisdiction within Article III, in all cases that come before 
them.410 Instead, modern equity is best conceptualized as an analogue to the 
common law and should be treated as such for Erie purposes, to the extent 
constitutionally permissible.411 
The body of equitable principles, including remedial principles, that 
governs a claim is a function of the law that gave rise to that claim. When a 
claim arises under a state statute or state common law,412 that state’s body of 
remedial law—including its equitable principles—should determine the 
available remedies. The court should treat the requirements for equitable re-
lief the same as it does the elements of the underlying cause of action. There 
is no freestanding body of general or federal equitable principles with the 
force of law that a court is required to apply.413 
Such a repudiation of Guaranty Trust and the equitable remedial rights 
doctrine would have the most dramatic consequences for injunctive relief for 
state-law claims in federal court. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court ap-
plies a four-factor test set forth in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C. to de-
termine whether to grant permanent injunctions and a similar test from Winter 
                                                                                                                                       
 410 See supra notes 165–181 and accompanying text. 
 411 The Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trials is the most prominent example of a con-
stitutional provision that sometimes requires federal courts to distinguish between legal and equi-
table claims. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 412 The same principle holds true for state constitutional provisions, but the Eleventh 
Amendment will seldom permit federal courts to enforce them. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984) (“[A] federal suit against state officials on the basis of 
state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when—as here—the relief sought and ordered has 
an impact directly on the State itself.”). 
 413 As discussed in the previous Sections, there is no valid alternative to this approach. The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide substantive standards to govern equitable relief. 
See supra notes 241–294 and accompanying text. The Rules of Decision Act directs courts to 
apply state statutes and judicial rulings for claims arising under state law, and no other federal law 
authorizes federal courts to apply their own equitable remedial standards instead. See supra notes 
295–352 and accompanying text. Federal courts lack constitutional authority to impose a uniform 
set of equitable principles in diversity cases, see supra notes 359–398 and accompanying text, and 
no important national interest exists warranting creation of federal common law to govern the 
issue, see supra notes 399–409 and accompanying text. 
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v. Natural Resources Defense Council for preliminary injunctions.414 Some 
states have rejected the eBay415 and Winter standards.416 Others have laws 
expressly mandating the award of injunctive relief in situations where federal 
equitable principles would dictate that courts exercise discretion under 
eBay.417 Several state statutes permit or require injunctive relief even when 
one or more of the traditional equitable requirements identified in eBay have 
not been satisfied.418 
California law identifies seven types of cases in which injunctions may 
be issued, and seven types of injunctions courts may not grant.419 For exam-
ple, California law allows injunctive relief whenever an obligation arises 
from a trust.420 New York421 and Texas422 also have statutes codifying stand-
ards for injunctive relief that differ from the federal tests. 
Other states have adopted their own sets of standards, either in general 
or for particular types of cases,423 in judicial opinions. In Alaska, for example, 
a plaintiff is required to make only “a clear showing of probable success” to 
obtain a preliminary objection.424 Arkansas relies only on two elements: 
“whether irreparable harm will result in the absence of an injunction . . . [and] 
whether the moving party has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
                                                                                                                                       
 414 See supra notes 266, 268 and accompanying text. 
 415 See Bd. of Revision of Taxes v. City of Phila., 4 A.3d 610, 627 (Pa. 2010) (holding that a 
plaintiff need not show irreparable injury to obtain a permanent injunction); City of Houston v. 
Proler, 373 S.W.3d 748, 764–65, 764 n.14 (Tex. App. 2012) (declining to apply eBay to injunc-
tions under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act and holding that the act “supersed[es] 
the equitable requirements generally applicable to common-law injunctive relief”), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part on other grounds, 437 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. 2014); Levisa Coal Co. v. Consolida-
tion Coal Co., 662 S.E.2d 44, 53 (Va. 2008) (holding that a court must automatically issue a per-
manent injunction when a state statute authorizing injunctive relief is violated). 
 416 See IB Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Rancho Del Mar Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 263 P.3d 69, 72 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“The relevant difference between . . . Winter and [Arizona’s] standards is 
that Winter requires the party seeking an injunction to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely, 
rather than merely possible.”). 
 417 See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Outdoor Media Grp., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 22–
23 (Cal. App. 1993) (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 5461). 
 418 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-268-105 (1969) (cited in Hall v. City of Bryant, 379 
S.W.3d 727, 733 (Ark. App. 2010)). 
 419 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526 (West 2017); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3422; see, e.g., 
Sims Snowboards, 863 F.2d at 646. 
 420 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526(a)(7). 
 421 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6301 (McKinney 2017) (preliminary injunctions). 
 422 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.011 (West 2017). 
 423 See, e.g., City of Okoboji v. Parks, 830 N.W.2d 300, 309 (Iowa 2013) (establishing gen-
eral standards for permanent injunctions that substantially differ from eBay); Hirshfield v. 
Schwartz, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 867 (Cal. App. 2001) (establishing special standards for injunc-
tions prohibiting encroachments on real property); accord LSAC, Inc. v. State, 222 Cal. App. 4th 
1265, 1281 (Cal. App. 2014). 
 424 A.J. Indus. v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 470 P.2d 537, 540 (Alaska 1970). 
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merits.”425 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that a person 
suing as a “private attorney general” may obtain a preliminary injunction by 
demonstrating only a likelihood of success on the merits and that the request-
ed relief would be in the public interest.426 
Even where states have adopted standards comparable to eBay or Win-
ter, the exact formulations of their elements often differ. For example, some 
states require a plaintiff to show a “reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits.”427 Other states require a “strong likelihood of success on the mer-
its,”428 and still others allow relief even if the plaintiff shows only “some pos-
sibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the 
claim.”429 Likewise, some states require a plaintiff to show that the hardship 
an injunction would cause to the defendant does not outweigh the benefit the 
plaintiff would obtain from an injunction,430 while others require the plaintiff 
to show “the balance of hardships” favors it.431 Thus, a federal court’s deci-
sion to apply state law to equitable relief can have a substantial impact on 
whether a plaintiff is able to obtain a preliminary or permanent injunction. 
In contrast, for claims arising under federal statutes, the standards gov-
erning equitable relief are a matter of statutory interpretation.432 If a law does 
not provide a remedy for violations, federal courts may assume that Congress 
implicitly authorized them to award any appropriate remedy, including equi-
table relief pursuant to traditional principles.433 When a statute provides for 
an injunction as a remedy, a court may likewise presume that Congress im-
plicitly intended to incorporate traditional equitable principles as set forth in 
eBay and Winter.434  
Congress may authorize or require courts to instead apply different fac-
tors, or even grant injunctive relief automatically, through express language in 
                                                                                                                                       
 425 Baptist Health v. Murphy, 226 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Ark. 2006). 
 426 LeClair v. Town of Norwell, 719 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Mass. 1999). 
 427 TFT, Inc. v. Warning Sys., Inc., 751 So. 2d 1238, 1242 (Ala. 1999), overruled on other 
grounds, Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173 (Ala. 2008). 
 428 TP Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Simms, 307 P.3d 56, 62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). 
 429 Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Cal. 1992). 
 430 TFT, Inc., 751 So. 2d at 1242. 
 431 TP Racing, 307 P.3d at 62. 
 432 Morley, supra note 267, at 182–94. 
 433 See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 63 (1975) (holding that, to obtain an 
injunction in an implied right of action, a plaintiff must “establish[] the traditional prerequisites of 
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use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”). 
 434 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391–92 (holding that the eBay factors apply where “Congress intended” 
they do so); see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Morley, supra note 267, 
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278 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1 
a statute’s text or legislative history.435 Under this “clear-statement” rule, a 
court must issue an injunction, rather than balancing equities in accordance 
with traditional principles, when a statute clearly mandates it.436 In the ab-
sence of such clear language, the statute itself—not Article III, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or some independent body of principles with the 
force of law—implicitly requires the court to apply traditional equitable prin-
ciples in deciding whether to grant relief. 
The same principle applies to federal constitutional violations. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly recognized that Congress generally has ultimate 
control over the nature and scope of constitutional remedies.437 When Con-
gress has not provided a remedy for a constitutional violation, a federal court 
is free to apply traditional equitable principles as a matter of constitutional 
common law.438 Congress retains authority to displace those traditional stand-
ards, however, by either broadening or restricting the circumstances under 
which equitable relief is available.439 
When a plaintiff presents multiple claims in a diversity or supplemental 
jurisdiction case, a federal court should apply traditional equitable principles 
when considering relief for the federal causes of action (or whatever alterna-
tive standards Congress established within each federal statute at issue), and 
apply that state’s body of equitable principles for the state-law claims. De-
pending on state law, a plaintiff may be able to obtain an injunction for her 
                                                                                                                                       
 435 Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544 (holding that a federal court may issue a statutory injunction only 
when it is warranted under the traditional requirements for injunctive relief, unless there exists a 
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 436 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978) (holding that injunctive relief 
was mandatory as a remedy for violations of the Endangered Species Act because allowing courts 
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Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778–79 (1991))). 
 438 See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1975). 
 439 See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 
(1996) (imposing stricter standards for the issuance of injunctions concerning prison conditions). 
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federal claims, but not her state ones, or vice versa. To ascertain a state’s body 
of equitable principles, a federal court should approach the issue in the same 
way it attempts to resolve any other question of state law under Erie.440 By 
relying on state law to address equitable remedial issues in diversity and sup-
plemental jurisdiction cases, the federal judiciary can inter the remaining lin-
gering remnants of general law’s brooding omnipresence.441 
CONCLUSION 
From the nation’s founding, the Supreme Court treated equity as a paral-
lel body of general law to be applied in all cases that federal courts adjudi-
cate. Erie laid to rest the vast majority of general law, but Guaranty Trust in-
explicably exempted a substantial part of federal equity law from the Erie 
Doctrine. The time has come to complete the task that Erie started nearly a 
century ago and banish the lingering remnants of the old federal equity pow-
er. 
The principles adopted by the English Court of Chancery are not bind-
ing on the federal judiciary, either of their own force or pursuant to Article III. 
And neither the Constitution, any federal statute (including the Rules of Deci-
sion Act), nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires or empowers fed-
eral courts to apply their own body of equitable principles in determining the 
proper relief in diversity and supplemental jurisdiction cases before them. 
 Equity follows, and arises from, the law. When a federal court adjudi-
cates a state-law claim, the statutes and judicial precedents of that state should 
govern the availability of equitable relief. Conversely, when a federal court 
adjudicates a federal statutory claim that provides for equitable relief, it may 
presume that Congress implicitly intended to incorporate traditional equitable 
principles into the statute, unless its text or legislative history expressly pro-
vides otherwise. When adjudicating a federal constitutional claim, a federal 
court may apply traditional equitable principles as a matter of constitutional 
common law, unless Congress has provided otherwise. 
Rights and remedies are inextricably intertwined, and the remedies a 
state chooses to recognize (or prohibit) for particular entitlements reflect that 
state’s important policy decisions. A federal court may no more ignore a 
state’s remedial requirements and restrictions than it may the state’s underly-
ing causes of action. Neither a litigant’s ability to obtain relief, nor the nature 
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of relief a litigant may receive, should depend on whether the case is adjudi-
cated in federal or state court. 

  
 
